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COMMUNISM

Co-ordination and Control of the International Communist Movement

Interim Report

November 1948

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INTRODUCTORY REMARK

This report is the final one of a series on the international organization of Communism. The first two reports, "The Third (Communist) International, Structure and Functions," 1 November 1947, and "The Third (Communist) International, Personnel," 1 December 1947, provided tentative analyses of the organizational methods employed by the Comintern until its dissolution in 1943. The present interim report is an attempt to evaluate the evidence currently available on the international organization of Communism in the postwar period. The limitations imposed on such an analysis are considerable, both by the limited amount of acceptable evidence and by the informal and unsystematic fashion in which the international movement is co-ordinated today. It is felt, however, that the present report may be of some use in providing an objective framework for the further evaluation of the mostly confused and misleading statements which will continue to be supplied by sources of all types on this general topic. Additional relevant material and comments will be appreciated. This report will be revised when sufficient new evidence is procured on the clandestine aspects of the problems discussed.

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SECRETSummary of Conclusions:

On the basis of the limited evidence currently available the following conclusions have been reached on the organizational aspects of international Communist control and co-ordination:

1. The complex and, for its time, reasonably efficient central organization of the world Communist movement, the Third International or Comintern, was actually and effectively dissolved in 1943.

a. The Fascist thirties in Europe and World War II disrupted large elements of the Comintern field apparatus, and the headquarters staffs in Moscow had less and less real work to do in directing the fragmentary remnants of the illegal Party organizations in Europe.

b. The twenty-five year maturation of the non-Soviet Communist leadership and Party militants of the world movement had, by the end of World War II, reduced the need for the detailed organizational and tactical tutorial assistance that the Comintern had previously provided to the national Parties.

c. Immediate prewar and wartime conditions impelled the Soviet Party-Government to take a much more direct part in the overall direction of the movement, eliminating the necessity of an intermediate command echelon of foreign Communist leaders.

d. Stalin's and Zhdanov's statements that the Comintern had outgrown its usefulness and that a new organizational stage had been reached by the world movement may be accepted as a realistic and correct appraisal.

2. The "new organizational stage" in effect has meant decentralization---most of the Communist Parties outside the Soviet orbit now enjoy a considerable degree of organizational independence in the solution of their local and regional tactical problems. They are considerably aided in their work by the close consultative and organizational ties they maintain with each other, a practice deliberately stimulated by the Comintern from the very beginning.

a. As a general practice, the Parties engage in constant exchange of information, render each other all feasible

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assistance, and arrange for mutual representation at Party congresses and conferences and at meetings of front organizations.

b. Certain Parties are closely related to others by virtue of political and/or geographical factors: Parties within a "capitalist empire"; Parties within a colonial or semi-colonial area; "strong" Parties and neighboring "weak" Parties; Parties providing refuge to the central organization of an exiled Party.

c. The interrelations of Parties may be formalized by means of "International Departments" at the national level, through the assignment of representatives to "fraternal" Parties, and by special clandestine courier services.

d. The enormous number of individual Communists traveling between countries and continents sufficiently illustrates the broad extent of the informal relations maintained permanently within the international movement.

3. With the increased tactical independence of foreign Parties outside the Soviet orbit, a need for the complex clandestine field-control machinery developed by the Comintern no longer exists.

a. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has not recreated clandestine regional agencies for the control of Parties outside the Soviet orbit.

b. The CPSU is not reliably known to have assigned special Party representatives abroad to advise or supervise foreign Parties since the end of the war.

4. The Cominform represents a new type of "regional agency" created by the CPSU to provide additional ideological and organizational support to a key Soviet-Party effort in a strategic area.

a. Through its loose organization, the "executive" arm of the Cominform serves the CPSU as a convenient means of "democratic" policy co-ordination in an area of primary importance to the USSR.

b. Through the official Cominform newspaper the CPSU conveniently disseminates its current position on organizational, ideological, and tactical questions to all the Communist Parties of the world.

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c. There is no evidence that the Cominform has developed into a world-wide agency, a clandestine intelligence agency, or a tactical "control" organization.

5. The vacuum created by the dissolution of the Third International has not appreciably influenced the integration and effectiveness of the international Communist movement. The CPSU has assumed direct responsibility for the ideological and organizational guidance of foreign Parties, but has not found it necessary to re-establish an extensive control mechanism.

a. The basic loyalty of foreign Communist Parties to the Soviet Party-Government and the training and experience of their leadership enable the CPSU to exercise adequate ideological control through overt media (Soviet press, publication, radio, etc.) for the guidance of national leaders who need only occasional direct briefing by CPSU functionaries and can easily be summoned to the USSR or satellite areas for such purposes.

b. There is no evidence that the CPSU has established any kind of clandestine organization or any definable system to maintain push-button control of foreign Parties.

c. Contacts between the CPSU and Parties outside the Soviet orbit are only very occasionally effected through the meetings of foreign Party leaders and official Soviet representatives abroad.

6. It is entirely possible that the CPSU may, under the pressure of sharpening East-West conflict, replace this largely informal, organizational "control system" with an internationalized Cominform akin to the Comintern, but since, for some time in the future, major successes of the world movement can be achieved only by the Chinese, French, and Italian Parties, the development of an overall control organization will probably never be considered a very serious problem by the CPSU. It is more likely that organizational effort will be focussed upon the development of the clandestine or "illegal" action potential of all Parties and adequate communications channels among

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them and with the CPSU to serve as an efficient espionage and sabotage network in enemy areas upon the outbreak of the war which the CPSU very clearly anticipates within the next decade or two.

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~~SECRET~~1. DISPOSITION OF COMINTERN COMPONENTS 1933-43

By the mid-thirties the organization of the Comintern had achieved a far-flung, heavily staffed, and complex structure.¹ Its essential nucleus was the permanent headquarters organization in Moscow, a part of which functioned quite openly to provide political and administrative support to the national sections, while certain other departments, such as the Finance and International Liaison (OMS), operated on a strictly clandestine basis. A broad array of front organizations, some with headquarters in Moscow, others nominally directed from foreign capitals, had by then been launched with varying degrees of success. The conspiratorial apparatus of the Comintern had developed into several field bureaus as permanent regional subcenters, and into a series of clandestine radio stations, passport offices, CI "rops" and "instructors" of a somewhat more transitory nature. The effort of this entire organization was primarily focused on Europe, and the assumption of power by the Nazis was an important immediate factor in promoting the gradual disintegration of its complicated organizational mechanism.

Permanent Bureaus

The first section of the Comintern apparatus to disintegrate was quite naturally its field installations, and among these, the relatively large bureaucratized permanent bureaus. Of these "relay stations" between the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) in Moscow and the national sections abroad, the Western European Bureau (WEB) and the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB) were by far the most active and heavily staffed--and the only two whose history is at all adequately documented.

The WEB, which had maintained its headquarters in Berlin from at least the mid-twenties, was broken up by the German police in February 1933. However, a substantial part of its personnel and equipment managed to transfer to a "temporary" headquarters in Copenhagen where it continued to function at least until 1937. Other WEB and related components also set up shop in Stockholm, Prague, and Paris, but it is difficult to differentiate between their activities and the operations

1. See The Third (Communist) International: Structure and Functions, November 1, 1947.

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During the thirties, both OMS and the Organization Department had come under the direct control of the Soviet Intelligence Services. The Organization Department was reorganized about 1932 into the Cadre Department by Mikhail Trilisser, Chief of the Foreign Directorate (INU) of the OGPU, not only because of deteriorating Comintern security, but also to carry out within the sectional leadership of the Comintern ranks the Stalinist Party-purification program which the Secret Political Section of the OGPU was carrying out inside the CPSU itself. Over and beyond its security and operational activities, the major product of the Cadre Department's work was the compilation of a world-wide biographical file covering the members of all Parties and their sympathizers. The post-purge history of the Cadre Department is not documented, but wartime conditions must certainly have affected its efficiency, and it is an open question whether the department existed as such in May 1943 when the remnants of the Comintern were officially dissolved. The postwar existence of its highly valuable central biographical file is confirmed

[REDACTED] and it is a most likely hypothesis that the file has been incorporated into a department of the Central Committee/CPSU where it is available for reference to operations personnel of the MGB or GRU headquarters staff or that it has been lodged in the MGB headquarters itself.

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In similar fashion, OMS came under the direct control of OGPU in the mid-thirties with the replacement of Platinitsky, its original organizer, by Trilisser. The field facilities of OMS (wireless stations, safehouses, expert forgers, secret courier lines, etc.,) were clearly of immediate utility to Soviet intelligence activities abroad, and relatively full evidence testifies clearly to the close co-operation that existed between the Comintern and the Soviet Intelligence Services in the foreign field. This co-operation was so close in many known instances that the question is immediately raised as to whether OMS continued to exist as an autonomous Comintern agency into the war or whether it had already been completely absorbed by GUGBEZ/NKVD. Reports that OMS assets in China were entirely in NKVD hands by 1938, and that chiefs of OMS field stations were in all cases resident agents of GUGBEZ

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even before that date, would support the latter supposition. Definitive proof of direct NKVD control of a former Comintern functionary is supplied by the case of an American Communist who was assigned by the NKVD resident in the Soviet Embassy at Washington, D. C., in the spring of 1943 just before the Comintern's dissolution to organize a seaman-courier service.

Another recent and thoroughly documented case of the absorption of the OMS assets by Soviet Intelligence is the assignment at the outbreak of the war of one Harry Robinson, formerly OMS Chief for Western Europe, who was attached to the chief agent of an extensive GRU network in Western Europe, and assisted him in radio communication and liaison work until his capture by the Germans in 1942.

Scattered evidence on the existence of OMS radio stations during the war need not affect our estimate of how long OMS continued to exist as a Comintern agency. A more important consideration is the fact that the field agencies (permanent bureaus, CI reps) which the OMS was originally set up to service disappeared during the thirties and therefore left OMS with no substantial Comintern tasks to execute. Even before the war the integration of its usable assets with the much more efficient and secure networks of the Soviet intelligence agencies abroad was organizationally logical; during the war, this integration became imperative, particularly in Europe. Some of the Parties, however, controlled similar communications machinery quite independently of OMS; CP France and CP Switzerland, for example, maintained direct wireless contact with Moscow as late as 1944, and several other European Parties communicated their assent to the dissolution of the Comintern by wireless to Moscow in May and June 1943. The liquidation or transfer of OMS assets therefore did not necessarily affect Party communication lines with the Moscow center or with each other. That Parties outside the Soviet belt are being given postwar OMS-type service through official Soviet Party-Government channels is evidenced by the repatriation of German and Austrian Communist exiles from Mexico by Soviet vessels (1946/1947).

Various agencies of the Comintern, both at headquarters and in the field, played a part in the organization and direction of the illegal apparatus in at least the major Parties. These illegal apparatus, operating

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parallel to the legal or underground Party organization, carried out these espionage, sabotage, and army and police infiltration functions which required a strictly covert approach. While both the Organization Department and OMS probably played a senior role in guiding and supporting these clandestine Party activities, it seems likely that the Comintern shared top controls with the Soviet Intelligence Services, particularly OGPU and its successors, to whom apparat activities were of both immediate and collateral operational value. Numerous cases can be cited in which illegal apparat personnel were directly utilized in Soviet intelligence operations; in Germany, for example, intelligence collected by apparat operations was directly channeled to Soviet intelligence representatives in Berlin.

The training of illegal apparat personnel in sabotage, espionage, and revolutionary techniques was provided by the so-called "M-School" near Moscow and by special courses in the Lenin School, the instructors being Soviet military and intelligence personnel. The Comintern clandestine agencies (OMS, permanent bureaus, and CI reps) were responsible for the selection and safe movement to Moscow of Party functionaries assigned to the Lenin School which was operated under the direct supervision of the CC/CPSU.² The illegal apparat system of the European Parties, particularly in its most highly developed phase in Germany, broke down under police persecution before the outbreak of war, and the requirements of M-training were clearly superseded by Partisan and intelligence agent training once war broke out.

It is obvious that the entire clandestine action apparatus of the Comintern was pretty thoroughly broken up before September 1939 and that whatever personnel and equipment remained up to the war were absorbed into operations of the official Soviet intelligence and military agencies. In short, the conspiratorial Comintern apparatus abroad was superseded partly by official machinery under the control of the CC/CPSU, partly by secret agencies of the Soviet Government.

2. The Lenin School definitely appears to have resumed training of foreign personnel in the postwar period, but the available evidence is too limited to permit an estimate of the scope of the training program.

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In broad terms, the world congresses, the plenary meetings of the Executive Committee (ECCI), and the Presidium of the ECCI provided the strategic organizational and action steering for the national Parties of the Comintern by means of political directives, resolutions, and specific policy decisions. Up to the mid-thirties this strategic policy direction had actually included, for the stronger as well as the weaker Parties, the handling of detailed tactical and local problems ranging from factory cell organization to election platforms.

The Seventh World Congress (1935) officially granted much greater tactical independence to the national sections, instructing the ECCI to stay clear of national organizational matters, and to confine itself to the formulation of the basic political line, the specialized training of "Bolshevik leaders," and providing assistance to the sections. Actually the basic political line after 1935, with its guiding slogan, "the United Front against Fascism," required very little restatement or amendment except during the short period of the German-Soviet pact. No world congress was again convened, no plenary sessions of the ECCI were held after December 1933, no significant policy statements of the Presidium or the Political Secretariat were published in the official Comintern press³ except for Dimitroff's denunciation of World War II as "imperialist" in September 1939 and the Presidium decree dissolving the Comintern in May 1943.

Some of the leading Comintern functionaries (ECCI members) remained in Moscow during the entire period from 1935 to 1944-5, and it is fairly clear that their organizational responsibilities and activities did not reach the pre-1935 level, but merged gradually with the Soviet

3. The publication activities of the Comintern Agitprop Department came to a halt during the early forties. Its official organ, The Communist International, ceased publication in 1943, and was in essence succeeded by War and the Working Class (later Now Times) issued by the Agitprop Department of the CC/CPSU. The various news services provided to the national sections by the Press Section of the Comintern Agitprop Department also gradually dwindled away: International Press Correspondence (Imprecorr) with a world-wide circulation, ceased publication in 1940, Die Welt (Stockholm) was issued from 1939 to 1942, Rundschau ueber Politik und Arbeiterbewegung (Basle) from after 1933 to 1938, the telegraph agency, Rundschau Nachrichten Agentur (RUNAG) (Zurich) from 1933 to 1939. In practical terms, the former Comintern news service has been more than adequately carried out since May 1943 by TASS whose policies are determined by the Central Agitprop Department of the CC/CPSU.

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war effort. With the exception of the Comintern-managed organization of "International Brigades" during the Spanish Civil War (1936-9), there was little call for close direction of the European Parties which had been destroyed or paralyzed by the Fascist police forces and whose leaders invariably sought refuge in the USSR. With the invasion of the USSR in 1941, the chief problem of the international movement became one of assistance to the Soviet war effort, and the Comintern element in the USSR appears to have been absorbed by this task even before the actual dissolution of the Comintern. The participation of Comintern functionaries in the Communist-dominated liberation movements, such as the "National Committee of Free Germany" and the "Polish Committee for National Liberation," in the Antifa (anti-Fascist) schools for the political indoctrination of prisoners of war, in Partisan activities and radio propaganda campaigns, illustrates the integration of the Comintern leadership with the machinery of the CPSU.

This top echelon of the non-Soviet international Communist leadership, the men who provided the executive brains of the Comintern as opposed to the leading functionaries of the CC/CPSU under whose effective policy control they worked, fulfilled their wartime tasks in Moscow and returned to their own countries as soon as it was practicable or convenient for them to take over the reins of their own Parties. In effect, the leading non-Soviet organizers, theoreticians, and propagandists of the international movement transferred their directive, advisory, and organizational abilities from the international center to the national level. The major need for the best talent in the national Parties to exploit to the fullest the favorable postwar politico-economic situation, the development of the revolutionary core of the European Parties under prewar Fascist persecution and wartime underground resistance work, the simple basic political line of working toward "People's Fronts" or "democratic" governments of the Left, the presence of Soviet military and political personnel in most of the countries of Europe, the vast improvement in communications facilities for Soviet Government and Party agencies in the postwar period--all these and other factors clearly played their part in this major decentralization process.

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The degree to which the former leadership at the center has strengthened the world movement at the national level is clearly evident from the postwar assignments of the ECCI personnel elected by the Seventh and last Comintern Congress. About fifteen per cent of the current national leadership in the Eastern Hemisphere, excluding the USSR, are former Comintern functionaries holding key positions at the national executive level, such as Gottwald in Czechoslovakia, Thorez and Duclos in France, Togliatti in Italy, etc.⁴

Executive and Administrative Direction and Support

The daily work of the Comintern in directing and advising the national sections on organizational and political matters was carried out by the Political Secretariat working with and through a series of geographical Country-Secretariats (Leaderssekreteriate). The members of the Political Secretariat were in actual fact the working heads of the area or country sections carrying on routine Comintern business, and the Country Secretariats themselves were staffed on a rotational basis from the national sections. The political secretaries elected by the World Congress in 1935 were at the same time leading members of the ECCI (Dimitroff, Gottwald, Kuusinen, Manuilski, Marty, Ploek, Togliatti) and key Party leaders from the major countries of Europe. (Chen Shao-yu, the Chinese member, was an alternate.) In practical terms, they and comparable European Party leaders whether Comintern functionaries or not, became the effective leaders of the Party emigre groups in Moscow under the protection and tutelage of members and agencies of the Central Committee/CPSU even before 1943, and the formal dissolution of the Comintern apparently exercised little effect upon their assignments or their relationships with Soviet Party or Government agencies.

The growing difficulty of communications in Europe and the increasing number of Parties whose Central Committees (or significant fractions thereof) were no longer able to operate in their own countries clearly spelled the end of the rotational staffing of the Country Secretariats. On the other hand, the growing number of European Party functionaries who, from 1933 on, were sitting out their periods of enforced exile in

⁴ For a list of the current national assignments of former ECCI members see Appendix A.

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Moscow provided ready at hand precisely the type of functionary personnel who could be consulted by Soviet Party leaders on policy matters concerning their own Party elements abroad and who could take care of the routine correspondence between center and field that the Country-Secretariats had previously been handling.⁵

Since the almost exclusive preoccupation of the Soviet Party-Government with the European theater of war fortified even more the specialized interest of the CPSU in European Communist matters that had existed from the beginning, but had received a fresh impulse with the development of Nazi power, the alien Communists in Moscow found their national Party interests strongly supported by their Soviet comrades. In the evolution of this increasingly urgent and active wartime collaboration, however, the CC/CPSU assumed direct control of the most significant European Party matters, and in effect, by-passed the normal operations of the Comintern Country Secretariats. On the basis of available information it appears that the Country Secretariats were primarily assigned such wartime tasks as the operation of "black" radio transmissions (e.g., the "S A Sender" and "Radio Deutscher Volkssender") which were run by the Comintern. The degree to which the Country Secretariats also maintained, as in prewar days, effective communications with Parties or underground nuclei abroad cannot be estimated. The possibility of the disappearance of the organizational dividing line between the Country Secretariats and the exile groups in the USSR during the exile years should not be discarded; it is difficult to assert where, for example, the German Secretariat left off functionally and where the responsibility of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party in Moscow began. It is quite obvious that the foreign contacts of the CC/CP Germany were utilized wherever feasible without any consideration for secretariat jurisdiction.

That the Country Secretariats functioned up to the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943 is adequately established by evidence; however, in order to exploit European Communist capabilities fully for the winning of the war, the Soviet Party-Government took direct charge

5. For a list of foreign Party functionaries resident in the USSR during all or most of the war years see Appendix B.

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of their personnel and simply incorporated all foreign Communists in Moscow, Comintern functionaries or not, into the activities of Soviet Government agencies. The principal spheres of this activity were the Partisan movement, "official" propaganda over the Moscow radio, and the anti-Fascist indoctrination of prisoners of war.

Central Control of Partisan Movements in Europe

The immediate responsibility for directing all Partisan activity within and beyond the western borders of the Soviet Union was entrusted at the very start of the war to the Partisan Directorate of the NKVD. This directorate grew to be one of the largest and most firmly supported elements in the NKVD and was responsible not only for security, intelligence, and direct logistic support of Partisan groups behind the German lines, but also co-ordinated the Partisan movement with Red Army activities. It appears likely that a special central staff of the Partisan movement was established in 1943 under the direct control of the CC/CPSU (probably the military department).

The evidence for direct communications between Moscow and the various non-Soviet Partisan movements in Europe is far from adequate, but it is clearly established that the Communist-controlled resistance groups in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were, with some measure of success, brought under central control and provided with occasional support: e.g., the Polish partisan activities were run directly by the Partisan Directorate and a "Partisan staff for Poland," located in Lublin. An NKVD colonel, with the cover name Piotr, was attached in 1945 to the Armia Ljudowa, the Communist controlled Polish military resistance group, in order to direct its political work; Rudolf Slansky (present secretary general of the CP Czechoslovakia) was attached to the Partisan Directorate in 1944; and Maria Fazskas, wife of the present minister of transportation and communications in Hungary, was director of a Partisan school in Moscow training Hungarian prisoners of war for guerilla warfare. The case for Tito's Partisans (before the dispatch of a Soviet military mission to his headquarters corps in 1944) is not clear. Unverified reports claim that the Communist-led Partisan movement in Yugoslavia was initially organized by members of the Yugoslav Communist nucleus in Moscow who were parachuted into Yugoslavia. Similarly unverifiable reports state that a clandestine Comintern transmitter in

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Yugoslavia was transferred to Tito for direct communication with Red Army (and Partisan Directorate) headquarters in Moscow. The direct contacts between the Tito forces and Soviet military personnel during 1944 are well known.

No detailed evidence exists on direct communications between Moscow and the French Communist resistance movement over and beyond the public transmission of Thorez broadcasts from Moscow. It should, however, be noted that in 1940 a conference was held in Moscow at which Duclos and other French Party leaders were present, and that both Duclos and Andre Marty were reported in Algiers in 1943, the latter having resided in the USSR from about 1940 on. The Italian Communist, Gino Moscatelli, was reportedly parachuted from a Soviet plane into Northern Italy "early in the war." Although it is upon such slender evidence that the degree of effective Moscow control of Communist-controlled resistance activities in Western and Central Europe must be estimated, there can be little question that, whatever its extent, the effective direction and support of this movement would have far exceeded the capabilities of the Comintern organization.

"Official" Propaganda Activities

The personnel of the European Country Secretariats, as well as the non-Comintern Party functionaries in Moscow, provided a reservoir of talented script writers, broadcasters, and leaflet composers for the Soviet psychological warfare effort. Except for the "black" stations broadcasting to Germany and Austria, this entire sphere of activity was under direct Party and Government control. Many of the non-Comintern functionaries (such as Sepp Schwab, Germany) found employment with Radio Moscow, others were involved in writing propaganda tracts (Erich Weinert, Germany) and even the paid Comintern functionaries (Ernst Fischer, Austria; Ruggiero Grieco, Italy) were frequently called in to contribute to the official government program. Again, the Comintern secretariats played but a minor part in a major effort.

Antifa Prisoner of War Indoctrination

The Soviet program for the indoctrination of German, Italian, and other prisoners of war apparently began just before the dissolution of the Comintern. The primary administrative responsibility for the control and

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maintenance of prisoners of war belonged, of course, to the Central Directorate of Prisoners of War and Internees (GUVPI) of the NKVD, but the "political exploitation" of prisoners of war fell within the authority of the Central Political Directorate of the People's Commissariat for Defense (NKO) which was responsible to the Military Branch of the Central Committee for Party work in the Red Army. Accordingly, the CC/CPSU, a senior member of which headed the Central Political Directorate, was directly responsible for the organization of anti-Fascist schools in 1942, for the indoctrination of foreign prisoners of war with Communist ideology or pro-Soviet sentiment, and for incidental recruitment of intelligence agents. Comintern functionaries, and non-Comintern personnel as well, were simply called upon to carry out lecturing and other curricular assignments in the Central Antifa School near Moscow, in the various Antifa schools attached to each Army group, and in the major prisoner of war camps and indoctrination centers. Most prominent in this work were Togliatti and D'Onofrio among the Italian prisoners, Pieck, Ackermann, Matern, among the Germans, etc.

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At the very beginning of the war, and even more so as the Soviet Government began its dynamic and aggressive military, political, and psychological offensive after Stalingrad, the power and prerogatives of the Comintern executive over the foreign Parties had already become seriously curtailed, and its organizational and personnel assets had been depleted to the extent that by May 1943, the Comintern apparently comprised a handful of people carrying out haphazard functions in what must have been a very informally organized headquarters. The congresses, ECCI plenary meetings, presidial discussions, publication activities, issuance of political directives, organizational Party controls, regional control centers, Comintern representatives--all were things of the past. Various elements of its former far-flung underground organization abroad had been integrated into the operations of official Soviet agencies and its field support agencies liquidated because they no longer had anything to support. Virtually all that remained were groups of foreign Party personnel sitting in Country Secretariats and forming a nucleus for their non-Comintern Party colleagues in Moscow (some of whom the Comintern hired for temporary assignments) who were busy with radio, news, and organizational propaganda work.

The sole available first-hand report by a qualified observer provides some interesting details (on the last days of the Comintern). Most of the Comintern personnel in Moscow were evacuated in the winter of 1941 to Ufa (northeast of Kuibyshev) where they occupied the Pioneer Palace. The majority returned to Moscow (their "office" was located in "a suburb near a large exhibition ground") in May 1942, with the possible exception of the "Latin Section" or Country Secretariat:

"On the return trip there were five or six railroad coaches full of Comintern functionaries and employees...among them, Appelt, Florin, Pieck, Ulbricht, Ackerman; Grete Keilson, Pieck's secretary; a girl named Maria; Ulbricht's former wife, Rose, who belonged to the French Section of the Comintern; and a Spaniard and his beautiful wife...Erpenbeck and Droell stayed in Ufa to continue operating the SA Sender. Willmann boarded the train at Kuibyshev, where the State Radio had been evacuated, and accompanied the group to Moscow."

The same source proceeds to describe the fate of the German functionaries at the time of the Comintern's dissolution: some entered the Political Section of the Red Army (Otdel 7) to continue working for Radio Deutscher Volkssender and the SA Sender which were transferred to the Central

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Political Directorate of the Red Army from the Comintern; some were assigned to an institute headed by Dinitrov to work on "socialist research"; the remainder were absorbed by the National Committee of Free Germany. It may safely be assumed that the fate of the other sections was similar to that of the very active and well-staffed German Secretariat.

Only a few of the various Comintern front organizations seem to have survived the Comintern. They were affected by the same factors which brought about the dissolution of the parent organization. Since the middle thirties then, the major Comintern auxiliaries gradually went out of business: the Profintern (Red International of Labor Unions),⁶ The International of Seamen and Harbor Workers, the Communist International of Youth, the Worker's International Relief, the International Relief, the International Red Aid, the League Against Imperialism. Other similar organizations which were clearly created for a specific purpose, such as the "World Committee Against War and Fascism," or the "International Relief Committee for Victims of Hitler's Fascism," were more ephemeral in character and folded up when their objectives had been accomplished.

Only the "All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries," and its offshoot, "Friends of the Soviet Union," with their parallel organizations outside of the USSR, have continued into the postwar period. These organizations, however, have gradually become direct outlets for the propaganda activities of the Soviet Government itself which, through the Foreign Ministry and its installations abroad, has assumed direct control.

During the war this trend toward direct Soviet sponsorship became even more evident when the CPSU began to organize such international fronts as needed (e.g., the Pan-Slav Committees, the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth and Soviet Women) and directed its fractions into international organizations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Federation of Democratic Youth.

⁶. The Profintern was reportedly dissolved in 1937 or 1938.


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Little more can be said on the "dissolution" of the Comintern.⁷

The procurement of legally satisfactory evidence on the actual dissolution of each and every component of the Comintern from its top executive down to its routine publishing and propaganda departments is, by the very nature of the Comintern's functioning and Soviet security precautions in general, out of the question. The inadequate but cumulative evidence, cited in this section, clearly indicates the shift in the organizational requirements of the international Communist movement in this, its matured stage, and the complete absence of a single reliable piece of evidence attesting to the continued existence of the Comintern since May 1943, should definitely refute the belief that the Third International has

"gone underground."



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7. Reports that the "Liquidation Commission of the Communist International"—staffed by Dimitrov, Manuilski, Togliatti, Ercoli and Pieck, and charged with the disposition of the assets of the Comintern — constituted a covert continuation of the Third International are unverified, as is the allegation that out of the Liquidation Commission grew an "International Communist Co-ordination Committee" composed of former ECCI functionaries.
8. The indiscriminate post war application of the term "Comintern" to Communist personnel and activities concerned with "secret" or "subversive" aspects of the movement was superseded in the fall of 1947 by an equally indiscriminate use of the more up-to-date tag "Cominform."

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SECRETII. NORMAL INTERPARTY CO-ORDINATION

The complex problems of current international Communist co-ordination and control cannot be approached without adequate consideration of the perfectly normal -- though not always overt -- relationships that exist between the national components of any international organization, and particularly of the extremely cohesive Communist movement. Co-operation, mutual aid, and consultation between the national Parties of the Communist movement have been developed over a period of more than thirty years of militant activity, consistently expanding with the proliferation and growth of the parties themselves and reaching a maximum in the organizational and operational successes of the postwar period.

The Comintern statutes and directives called upon all "sections" to maintain close organizational and informational contact with each other, to arrange for mutual representation at each other's congresses, to exchange leading functionaries, to provide assistance to Party organizations and members in exile, and particularly, for Parties in "imperialist" mother countries to provide assistance and advice to Parties in colonial areas. The Comintern's official regulation of these routine interparty contacts was confined to requiring formal ECCI authorization for the temporary transfer of a functionary from one Party to another.

The dissolution of the Comintern's central executive apparatus had no appreciable effect upon the maintenance of these normal interparty relations. In fact, during the period preceding the war, and even more so during the war itself, the political developments in Europe actually aided in widening the existing contacts among the various national Parties. Numerous nuclei of Italian, Spanish, German, Austrian, Hungarian, Scandinavian and other refugee Communists escaping from police persecution in the thirties, took refuge in various capitals of Europe and the Western Hemisphere (Paris, London, New York, Mexico City, etc.). In the course of this Communist diaspora the Parties of the exile countries assumed extensive protective and advisory functions towards these groups and individuals.

9. During this Communist political migration it was general practice that a refugee Communist had to be accredited by his Central Committee to the Central Committee of the exile country. This procedure led to

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In the postwar period, there is ample evidence that the Comintern-inspired principle of maximal interparty co-operation has prevailed. In some cases Parties have created special departments for the handling of routine international relations, such as the International Department of CP Czechoslovakia, the International Affairs Committee of CP Great Britain, the Department for Foreign Connections (Ausländische Verbindungen) of the SED. In other cases, foreign representatives have been attached to fraternal Parties as liaison officers.

A. Routine Mutual Aid and Co-operation

It is important to realize that there are many international problems which can be effectively handled by a group of Parties through normal channels on the national level. The principal business of world Communism, in practical terms, boils down to specific, local issues: what propaganda line to develop, how to recruit and train members, how to infiltrate specific labor organizations or governmental and police agencies, what type of front organizations to set up, how to adjust to the political climate, what alliances to make, etc. There is no evidence to support the belief that such local matters are currently made the subject of regular control by the CPSU, directly or indirectly, any more than in the immediate prewar period. Apart from the sheer bureaucratic impracticability of such universal management - repeatedly acknowledged by the Comintern - a realistic approach to the problems of international organization obviously calls for the granting of considerable organizational independence to the national Parties in order to strengthen the action capabilities of an organization which would otherwise rely on paternal controls to the extent that it became ineffectual.

many complications, and in several instances (e.g., in Belgium) a Communist refugee found himself cut off from the Party for lack of proper papers.

This practice continues. In Mexico, for example, individual Communist immigrants from other countries have to be accredited by their own Party to the Central Committee of CP Mexico which in turn assigns the immigrant to a Mexican Party cell. In case of large groups of Communist immigrants, CP Mexico organizes them into a cell of their own. However, this principle does not apply to members of Parties which are suppressed in their homeland and have set up a headquarters and an organization abroad. CP Spain, for example, has maintained its own organization and jurisdiction over its far-flung members in Europe and the Americas.

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Similarly, numerous interparty problems have been and are being worked out quite satisfactorily without interference from the center, whether it be the dispatch of a courier to obtain funds, the discussion of political problems common to several Parties, advice on running a newspaper or a propaganda campaign, establishment of clandestine communication lines, or the provision of safe haven. Maximal exploitation of such independent interparty relations should again be considered a factor contributing to the solidarity and efficiency of the movement.

The principal methods by which these routine interparty relationships are carried out in the postwar world are briefly illustrated below:

1. Exchange of Fraternal Delegates. Improvements in the free movement of personnel in the postwar period have facilitated the public participation by Party representatives from one country in the national congresses (and occasionally conferences) of another Party. The dispatch of "fraternal delegates" to such Party congresses has increased in volume during the postwar period far beyond the normal practices of the thirties; the delegates in many cases have been drawn from the highest ranks of the Party and are therefore capable of speaking with some authority for the local Party abroad. It is only natural that many of these fraternal delegates have been chosen from among those who previously occupied positions in the Executive Committee of the Communist International, and have had extensive experience in handling regional and international policy problems, both organizational and political. The recurrent attendance at these various congresses of former ECCI members such as Jacques Duclos, Maurice Thorez, Leon Mauvais, Marcel Cachin for France; Harry Pollitt for England; William Z. Foster for the US; Tim Buck for Canada; Emil Lovlien, Peter Furuboth, Sven Lasse Linderoth for Scandinavia; Zachariades for Greece, etc., makes this point clear.

The foreign attendance at a few of the major congresses since the end of the war sufficiently illustrates the degree and quality of interparty co-ordination achieved or achievable at these public functions:

8th Congress of CP Czechoslovakia (Prague, March 1946). Attended by Jacques Duclos (France), Harry Pollitt (England), Zachariades and Profyrogannis (Greece), Karavasilov (Bulgaria), Gosniak (Yugoslavia), Jose (Spain) and delegates from Poland, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Holland, and Austria.

The regional character of this national congress is best reflected in a report made by Zachariades to the Central Committee of CP Greece upon his return from Prague: "Comrades, as you know, the Czechoslovak

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Communist Party, on the occasion of its 8th Congress, invited all the European Communist Parties to attend by sending delegations to Prague. Almost all the European Communist Parties...were present at the 8th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. This congress can therefore be considered of Pan-European character owing to the presence of so many representatives from other countries... During our discussions...we fixed the tactics to be followed by all Communist Parties in order to reach our strategic goal. They may be summed up in the following words: a consistent uncompromising struggle against Anglo-Saxon imperialism."

13th Congress of CP Sweden (18-22 May 1946). Attended by delegates from Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Iceland, Finland, Norway, and England; among them, Jan Schalken (Netherlands), Harry Pollitt (England), Emil Lovlien and Peter Furubotn (Norway).

Third Congress of CP Hungary (September 1946). Attended by representatives of the CPs of Great Britain, France, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Switzerland; among them, Sven Lasse Linderoth (Sweden), Marcel Cachin (France), and Karl Hofmaier (Switzerland).

19th Congress of CP Great Britain and Empire Conference (London, February/March 1947). Attended by twenty-seven representatives of Communist Parties in British dominions, colonies and mandated territories and by twenty-six fraternal delegates from Communist Parties of other lands. Half of the time of the congress was taken up by the speeches of the fraternal delegates who reported on the status of their national Parties. The scope of the congress and the Empire Conference--the first held since the termination of the war--and its organizational significance, may be illustrated by the list of attending delegates. Representatives of Communist Parties in British dominions, colonies and mandated territories came from Australia, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Cyprus, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Malaya, Palestine, South Africa, West Africa and West Indies. Nineteen other foreign Communist Parties were represented.¹⁰

10. The delegates were:

- Austria: Siegfried Fuernberg, secretary general/CP Austria.
- Belgium: Raymond Dispy, member of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat/CP Belgium.
- Cuba: Anibal Escalante - Dellunde, member of the Political Bureau/CP Cuba.
- Czechoslovakia: Vilim Novy, chief editor of the Party journal Rude Pravo.
- Denmark: Akeel Larson, chairman/CP Denmark.
- Finland: Toivo Karvenen, editor of the Finnish Party organ.
- France: Joanny Berlioz, member of the Central Committee and of the editorial board of Democratie Nouvelle.
Leon Mauvais, member of the Political Bureau.
- Germany: Willy Agatz, a secretary/CP Essen.
Leopold Bauer, member of District Executive Committee/CP Hesse.
Albert Buchmann, chairman/CP Wurttemberg.
Gustav Rudolf Gundelach, secretary/CP Hamburg.
Max Reinmann, chairman/CP in Ruhr district.
- Greece: Miltiades Prophyrogenis, member of Central Control Committee/CP Greece.
- Holland: Saul de Groot, secretary general/CP Holland.
- Hungary: Marton Horvath, editor of CP paper Szabad Nep, recently appointed to Cominform editorial staff.
- Iceland: Eggert Halldar Thorbjarnarson, secretary/United Socialist Party.
- Lebanon: Farajallah Hillu, secretary/CP Lebanon.
- Norway: Erling Heiestad, member of Central Committee and editorial staff of Party organ Friheten.
- Poland: Wladislaw Bionkowski, deputy chairman of Parliamentary Group of Polish Workers' Party.
Rudolf Chain Heller @ Rudolf Hiebsch, connected with Polish Ministry of Navigation.
- Spain: Garcia Antonio Mijo, member of Central Committee/CP Spain.
- Sweden: Nils Gosta Holmberg, member of Executive of Central Committee/CP Sweden.
- Syria: Khalid Baghdash, secretary/CP Syria.

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Eleventh Congress of CP/France (Strasbourg, June 1947). Attended by delegates from the Lowlands and North African Parties, Czechoslovakia, England, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia; among them Dolores Ibarruri (Spain), Velio Spano (Italy), Zachariades (Greece), Harry Pollitt and Palme Dutt (England).

Sixth Congress of CP/Italy (Milan, January 1948). Attended by fraternal delegates from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Free Territory of Trieste, Great Britain, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Switzerland, USSR, and Yugoslavia; among them Eugenio Gomez, secretary general/CP Uruguay; Vladimir Popov, member of the Politburo/CP Bulgaria; Harry Pollitt; Maurice Thorez; and Pavel Yudin, Vagan Grigoryan and Dimitri Shevliagin as delegates of CPSU. The presence of the three Soviet delegates constitutes the first known instance of direct Soviet participation in a national congress since the end of the war.

20th Congress of CP Great Britain (London, February 1948). Attended by fraternal delegates from Austria, France, Northern Ireland, Italy, Spain, and West Africa.

Second Congress of CP India (February-March 1948, Calcutta). Attended by fraternal delegates from Burma, Ceylon, Australia, and by Vladimir Dodger and Radovan Zogovic of CP Yugoslavia. The presence of these two Yugoslav Communists at an Indian Party congress is an ideal illustration of the international ramification of the institution of "fraternal delegates."

9th Congress of CP Belgium (Brussels, May 1948). Attended by delegates from Italy, France, Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, Austria, Rumania and Hungary; among them Thorez (France), Spano (Italy).

14th Congress of CP Sweden (Gooteberg, May 1948). Attended by delegates from Italy, Spain, France, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Denmark, Finland, Iceland; among them Donini (Italy) and Fajon (France).

In general, the principal business of these national congresses is handled on the public platform, with fraternal delegates actively participating in the speech making and submission of resolutions, particularly on matters of direct concern to their own Parties. In addition to the regional or international questions discussed openly at these congresses and generally appearing in the public and Party press (e.g., the "free" Greek government at the Strasbourg congress), it is fairly obvious that confidential discussions among the foreign delegates offer the most effective possible means of settling on the spot organizational, policy and tactical problems affecting more than one Party.

2. Clandestine Regional Meetings. The fact that leaders of neighboring Parties frequently get together to discuss mutual problems without the fanfare and publicity surrounding the official Party congresses, and frequently also without the knowledge of the local police, should not be considered unusual, and the clandestine character of such meetings does not in itself prove that the agenda includes "illegal" matters of strategic interest. A "secret" meeting in Hamburg (April 1947) attended

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by local German and Danish Communist leaders, for example, was apparently called simply to discuss the effect of the US program for aid to Greece. More recently, an unadvertised meeting of Communist leaders from the Benelux countries took place in Paris (April 1948) in order to formulate the Communist position vis-a-vis the "Western Union." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the leaders of Latin American Parties arrange to meet their colleagues from neighboring countries at least quarterly, if not more frequently.

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The only case in which a completely secret agenda of such clandestine meeting has been reliably reported is the unadvertised conference of Scandinavian Party leaders held in Oslo from 20-22 February 1948. Attended, among others, by such functionaries as Hertta Kuusinen (CP Finland), Sven Linderot (Chairman/CP Sweden), Emil Lovlien (Chairman/CP Norway), Axel Larsen (secretary general/CP Denmark), the meeting apparently discussed such genuinely clandestine matters as the organization of an "illegal" courier system, the reactivation of Norwegian Communist sabotage groups, and the dispatch of students to training schools in the USSR.

Little more can be said on this aspect of Communist interparty coordination except that there are in most countries no legal means of preventing the leaders of neighboring Parties from holding private discussions.

3. International Front Organizations. A list of overt meetings of international front organizations held during the first quarter of 1948 quite adequately illustrates the possibilities provided for informal discussions and caucuses of the Communist fractions present at these gatherings:

Meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Union of Students (Prague, January 1948)

Second Congress of the Yugoslav Anti-Fascist Women's Front (Belgrade, January 1948)

Meeting of the International Association of Former Political Prisoners (Prague, February 1948)

South East Asia Youth Conference (Calcutta, February 1948)

Executive meeting of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (Rome, February 1948)

Meeting of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (London, February 1948)

Second Congress of the United Workers Trade Union (Bulgaria, February 1948)

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Meetings connected with the International Women's Week and World Youth Week (March 1948)

Congress of the Latin American Labor Federation (Mexico City, March 1948)

15th National Congress of the British Young Communist League (March 1948)

Congress of the National Committee for Belgian-Soviet Friendship (Antwerp, April 1948)

Executive session of the World Federation of Trade Unions (Rome, April 1948)

Latin American Student Congress (Mexico City, April 1948)

International Conference for Aid to Greece (Paris, April 1948)

One may be tempted to recall the Comintern days when Willy Muenzenberg, the eminence grise behind the old Comintern fronts, shuttled back and forth between Moscow and Western Europe with orders from the ECCI. There is, however, no reliable evidence as yet to indicate that any Party business is normally transacted at these meetings other than that involved in the official agenda.

4. Individual Travel. It is an established fact that, on general security principles, Communist Parties normally employ verbal rather than written communications in interparty matters of more than routine interest, since they are only too clearly aware that hostile police and intelligence agencies are most eager to intercept incriminating correspondence. Hence, as in the case of national communications within the Party, contacts of individuals provide a favorite and comparatively secure method of maintaining interparty relationships. In actual fact, the travel of individual Communists in the postwar world from country to country, across continents, and between the hemispheres has reached considerable proportions. In the period from 1 January to 30 April 1948 alone, for example, more than four hundred Communists from fifty-four countries (excluding the Soviet satellites) engaged in travel movements which took them into forty-nine countries, including the USSR. More than thirty per cent of these individuals traveled abroad as delegates to national Party congresses or meetings of international front organizations, and all of them traveled overtly on legal passports issued to them by their respective governments. The actual business abroad of the individual "legal" travelers attending a public meeting cannot be ascertained in many cases, and it is still impossible at this stage to make a sound estimate of the extent to

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which the practices of traveling clandestinely on illegal papers, formerly perfected by the International Liaison Department (OIS) of the Comintern, has developed in the postwar period. Certain categories of overt travel movements, however, are easily classified and can be briefly illustrated.

a. Party leaders: The travel of high Party functionaries, both in conjunction with national congresses or other meetings abroad and also on solo trips, offers the most useful method possible for discussing or settling interparty political, organizational, and action policy matters. The recent European tour of the CPUSA leader, William Z. Foster, offers a case in point. Foster, as fraternal delegate to the 19th Congress of CP Great Britain and Empire Conference, arrived in the United Kingdom on 10 February 1947 together with Tim Buck (National Executive, Labor Progressive Party of Canada) and frequently visited Party headquarters in London during his stay. Shortly after his arrival, he had a conference with Emile Touna, the delegate from the Arab League of National Liberation. Together with Tim Buck, Foster traveled to France on 5 March 1947 where several important meetings were reportedly held at Party headquarters in Paris -- one of these meetings was attended by Dolores Ibarruri, secretary general/CP Spain; Nina Popova, executive officer of the International Federation of Democratic Women and of the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Women; N. Mikhailov, executive officer of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and The Russian Young Communist League; and the French Party notables Thorez, Marty, Duclos, Mauvais, Cachin, Borlioz, Frachon, Monmousseau and Fajon. At this meeting Duclos emphasized that one of the most important tasks of Communists within the American Congress of Industrial Organizations was to bring about the union of CIO and AFL. Methods of defending the USSR in case of war were also reportedly discussed.

Following his stay in Paris, Foster went with Buck to Rome on 13 March 1947. Each morning during his stay at the Grand Hotel he was picked up by a car belonging to the CP Italy

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and driven off to an unknown destination. From 17 to 24 March 1947, Foster and Buck were in Yugoslavia. Foster was reported in Ljubljana where he discussed the Trieste situation with Boris Kraighor, and met other Party leaders.

Foster also visited Prague, at least on 5 and 7 April 1947, and Warsaw. He also had an Hungarian visa and it is very probable that he visited Hungary prior to 15 April when he was scheduled to return from Paris to London on his way back to the US. It is quite evident, even from the few facts available that Foster's trip provided an informal but quite effective means of co-ordinating news and policies with top European Party leaders, aimed specifically at the preparation of the CPUSA program announced shortly after his return.

Other recent tours have been somewhat less extensive. Eugenio Gomez, secretary general/CP Uruguay, left his country in December 1947 to attend the 6th National Congress of CP Italy (Milan, January 1948) as a fraternal delegate. Subsequently he was reported attending a "Cominform" meeting in Belgrade (mid-January 1948) and a meeting of the "Commission for International Policy" of the CC/CP France (Paris, April 1948) which worked out the political line of the Parties in the Benelux countries regarding "Western Union." Similarly, the Argentinian leader Rodolfo Ghioldi visited Paris in December 1947, met Thorez, Duclos and other high French functionaries, and reportedly attended the Belgrade meeting of the Cominform and returned in February 1948.

It is futile to speculate on the specific significance of such individual contacts. They are part and parcel of the normal political life of the Communist movement whose well-guarded, smoke-filled rooms are scattered all over the face of the globe. Rarely does the content of such discussions leak out to non-Party ears, and no bureaucratic record remains for subsequent exploitation. It is an unusual occasion when a man like Ghioldi is reliably reported to have brought back the news that the Lenin School in Moscow has reopened its courses for Latin American students.

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b. Communist Journalists: Editors, correspondents and reporters of Communist newspapers and magazines can, under the cover of their trade, move comparatively unhampered across geographical boundaries, and fulfill such Party business on the side as may be entrusted to them over and above their normal journalistic functions. The postwar movements of Party journalists have attained rather substantial proportions.

On a relatively local plane, for example, CP Brazil last year dispatched Armenio Guedes as correspondent of the Tribuna Popular on a tour from Brazil to Cuba, Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay (1947). Frithof Lager, chief editor of the Swedish Party newspaper, My Dag, consistently reported, but without factual evidence, as a co-ordinator of Party policy, has traveled to Prague (August 1947), Berlin and the Eastern Zone of Germany (December 1947).

American Communist journalists have also been frequently dispatched abroad on Party business. Joseph Starobin, editor of the New York Daily Worker, made an extended tour through Latin America in 1946 and 1947. He was reportedly charged with ascertaining the financial status of Latin American Parties, particularly in Brazil and Venezuela, and while in Brazil, attempted to obtain financial aid from CP Brazil for CP Colombia. Currently, Starobin is traveling in Europe. Harry Samuel Vinocur (also known as "Winogar" and "John Stuart"), foreign editor of the now defunct New Masses, and his wife, Helen Segall Vinocur, left in October 1947 on a trip which was intended to cover Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, Paris; they arrived in London on 14 March 1948 and Harry Vinocur reportedly attended a Cominform meeting (Belgrade, January 1948) previous to their return to the US. John Gates, editor of the New York Daily Worker and member of the National Board/CPUSA, received a passport for a three-week trip to cover the Italian elections on 18 April 1948 and the "political situation" in France. During his stay in Italy, Gates was reported to have attended a meeting of the Cadre Committee of the Rome Federation/CP Italy.

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c. Study Tours: Communists frequently travel under the guise of study tours. The recently arrested Indian Communist, S. A. Dango (Bombay), president of the All-India Trade Union Congress, traveled for eight months in Eastern Europe in the summer and fall of 1947, contacting Tito in Yugoslavia and spending about seven weeks in the USSR -- the avowed purpose of his tour was to study social conditions in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Similarly, the vice-chairman of CP Norway and the chairman of CP Denmark traveled in November 1947 to Finland in order to study the Finnish situation and the work of CP Finland.

d. Delegates of International Front Organizations: Traveling delegates or delegations of international Communist front organizations are obviously in a position not only to co-ordinate specific national Party front movements, but also to transact any items of related or unrelated Party business. Herbert Williams, for example, Australian member of the Executive of the World Federation for Democratic Youth, toured Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria on Youth front work in September and October 1947; in November 1947 he traveled through Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark; in December 1947 he left Paris for Trieste and Rome. More recently, a WFDY delegation toured several Latin American countries and participated in the Latin American Student Congress in Mexico City (April 1948).

5. Interchange of Party Publications. A vast volume of Party daily and weekly newspapers, cultural publications, theoretical journals, reprints of national congress resolutions and lectures of Party leaders flows regularly through the international mails. The publications of the more advanced or "mature" Parties (CP France, CP Great Britain, CPUSA) naturally receive the widest international circulation.

The CP France monthly theoretical magazine, Democratia Nouvelle (first issue January 1947), is a highly intellectualized informational publication which generally contains a majority of articles on non-French Communist problems and serves therefore as a significant clearing point for interparty exchange of views. The foreign contributors to Democratia Nouvelle in its first five issues included Tito (Politburo/CP Yugoslavia),

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Adhikari (Politburo/CP India), Harry Pollitt and Palme Dutt (Politburo/CP Great Britain), Velio Spano (Directorate/CP Italy), Vicente Uribe (Politburo/CP Spain), Leon Nicole (secretary general/CP Switzerland), Gheorghe-Dej (Politburo/CP Rumania), and Farajallah Hilu (Politburo/CP Lebanon). Similarly, articles by foreign contributors and articles on the problems of other Communist Parties will be found in almost every major Communist publication, e.g., in World News and Views of CP Great Britain, Political Affairs and Masses and Mainstream of CPUSA.

Through the constant exchange of these publications, both major and minor Parties in adjacent as well as in distant countries keep in touch with each other. CP Great Britain's publications crop up in India and Burma, CP France journals in North Africa and the Near East, while English versions of CP Palestine (PKP) handouts, and news bulletins published by the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of Germany and CP Czechoslovakia find their way as far as the CP Brazil.

This latter Party, for example, regularly received through the mails in 1947, Party publications and propaganda material from CP Mexico, and CP Argentine; La Democratie Nouvelle arrived monthly from France; L'Unita came weekly from Italy.

Such interchange of overt Party publications may be formalized by certain Parties as a matter of routine. CP Brazil, for instance, assigned a man to handle contacts with Communist publications and correspondence throughout the world. Exchange of publications between CP Austria and CP Switzerland is similarly organized by a Swiss subject who maintains liaison with the publishing house of the Austrian Party. In other cases, the Agitprop or information department is probably in routine charge of such business. The significance of this type of exchange carried out on the broadest possible basis both overtly and covertly when prohibited by the police should not be underestimated. The importance of properly directed publications for the organizational cohesion and sound ideological basis of the movement was recognized and stressed by Lenin as early as the Iskra days. A common pool of agitation, propaganda, and organizational discussion has been a bulwark of the Party since earliest days of the Comintern.

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6. Interparty Financial Aid. Just as constant personal contacts and exchange of publications further the action solidarity of the international movement, financial solidarity has also been achieved through informal practices of interparty aid. This principle was established in the early days of the Comintern itself -- Ossip Piatnitsky, head of the Comintern's Finance Department, ruled that the financial surplus of a solvent Party should be made available to Parties in financial straits in addition to any direct Comintern subsidization made. It was apparently felt by the Soviet leadership that Party leaders living completely off the Soviet purse might develop a feeling of bureaucratic security and lose their revolutionary dynamism -- such, the German Communist Krebs @ Valtin relates, was the case with the leaders of CP Great Britain in the early thirties.

Since confidential Communist financing is a reasonably private business, no precise and inclusive answers can yet be given as to the covert sources of Party funds throughout the world, but it is clear that Parties frequently seek and obtain financial support from more solvent brother Parties. Several standard practices may be briefly mentioned:

a. Direct Party Contributions: Funds are often transferred directly from Party to Party. At a meeting of CP Palestine (PKP) on 29 November 1945 it was announced that CP Great Britain had granted a loan of 3000 pounds to PKP. In June 1947 the son of the chief editor of the French Communist daily L'Humanite brought 180,000 Belgian francs to an unidentified Belgian Communist. In the summer of 1947 when CP Paraguay was unable to raise funds, an Argentine Communist received approximately 650 dollars from the Argentine Party for direct delivery to a Paraguayan leader. A Party may also, for example, defray the expenses of a foreign delegate attending one of its meetings -- Danish delegates reportedly received their expenses from CP Norway while attending the Oslo Conference of Scandinavian Communist leaders in February 1948.

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b. Funds through Fronts: Communist Parties frequently organize campaigns through front groups to raise funds for another Party in distress. In 1937 and subsequently the German Communist and former Comintern representative, Gerhart Eisler, collected funds in the US, especially among sympathetic Jewish circles, purportedly for German anti-Fascists, in conjunction with the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee. These funds, however, were actually destined for the German Communist Party in exile.

Similar practices continue into the postwar period. In the winter of 1945-46, Nikos Karvounis, journalist and member of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), together with other EAM and KKE members, left Greece for a propagandistic and fund-collecting junket in Western Europe and also stayed in the US for several months, appearing before sympathetic Greek-American groups and collecting contributions at dinners and other meetings. The funds collected were taken back to Greece by Karvounis in June 1946 and were destined for the KKE.

In Switzerland during the winter of 1946-47, a Spanish Communist front group, l'Association des Amis de l'Espagne, raised funds through balls or raffles and forwarded the proceeds to CP Spain headquarters in Paris.

More recently, international Communist financial assistance to the Greek Communist Party has apparently been funneled through various national "Committees for the Aid of Greek Democracy," notably the Comité Français D'Aide à la Grèce Démocratique which organized the International Conference for Aid to Greece (Paris, 10-11 April 1948). In this connection, the Cominform press organ reported on 1 March 1948 that the Hungarian National Committee for Aid to the Greek People had contributed 1½ million forints to the Greek fund and that similar organizations in Poland and Rumania were engaged in similar fund-collecting campaigns.

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These observations cannot be concluded without emphasizing again that "outside" sources of Party income are most elusive even when it comes to "normal" interparty transactions. Party bookkeeping generally does not conform to normal standards of business efficiency, and "confidential" financial activities are confined to secret records, if recorded on paper at all, and to the knowledge of a few select individuals. In practical terms, there may be not more than two persons in a given Party who know the actual financial status of the organization -- i.e., the secretary general and the national treasurer (chief of the Finance Department). Even the Auditing and Control Commissions established by most Parties do not, we suspect, have access to all financial records.

B. Formal Patterns of Interparty Co-operation

The more or less routine relationships described in the preceding section permeate the entire world Communist movement and are founded on countless workable contacts. The CP Finland, for example, maintains contact with the Finnish section of CPUSA, and it is therefore not surprising that it mobilizes its comrades in the USA for fund-raising campaigns in behalf of CP Finland. A German Communist who spent his years of exile in the Netherlands and worked with CP Netherlands will naturally be utilized for communication purposes with that Party. A Latin American Communist student enrolled in a US university again will be used as a Party channel to the CPUSA. It is evident that rigid relationship patterns simply do not exist at these levels.

On the other hand, certain more or less formal Party interconnections have been established on the basis of political and organizational conditions which inevitably throw certain Parties into an intimate relationship. These connections, which developed in the earliest stages of the movement under the aegis of the Cominform, have survived into postwar practice. If not recognized for what they are, they can both confuse the picture of international Communist co-ordination and permit false evidence to be adduced to support the existence of specially assigned regional centers.

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1. Intra-Empire Relations of Colonial Parties. Under the Comintern the Parties in "imperialist" or "advanced capitalist" mother countries were generally assigned tutorial-advisory functions toward the "colonial" Parties. The underlying reason was more a political than an organizational one: the Comintern wanted to be certain that the Party of the "imperialist motherland" adopted and reinforced the anti-colonial policies of the Parties in the colonies. The Communist Parties of Great Britain, France, and the United States, representing the major "imperialist" Parties, accordingly developed close ties with their sister Parties in the colonies in order to achieve policy co-ordination within the "empire." Before the war, for example, a special colonial department (Section Centrale Coloniale) existed within the Central Secretariat of CP France which maintained liaison with the sister Parties and Communist front organizations in the French colonies. This department apparently also assumed direction of the colonial elements residing in metropolitan France, and trained native instructors for work in the colonial areas. Thus CP France reached organizationally far beyond the confines of the motherland, without however assuming an international steering function which was then reserved for the Comintern.

Although at present no such clear-cut relationships can be documented thoroughly, occasional evidence indicates that the Parties of imperialist mother countries still maintain a central advisory position vis-a-vis colonial areas. Again, as in the prewar period, such relationships are to be interpreted as perfectly "normal" patterns of organizational relations within the world movement.

Obviously, changes in the structure of "empires," such as occurred after the war, have substantially changed the role of the mother Parties. The influence of CP France in Syria and Lebanon and the part played by CP Great Britain in the Far East and Palestine have diminished; yet the old established personal contacts and interparty connections still exist as part of the normal international life of the Parties.

In general, it must also be noted that existing intra-empire relations do not preclude consultative relations of any given colonial Party with other Parties, particularly within the surrounding area, and that it is therefore generally futile to look for clearly defined "channels of command." Furthermore, it is natural that Parties within

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an "empire" maintain relations not only with the mother Party but also among themselves. CP Malaya, for example, admitted in an official statement that it was in close contact with many Parties within the British Empire.

The present status of these intra-empire relationships may be briefly sketched as follows:

a. CP Great Britain: The postwar organizational responsibility of CP Great Britain toward the Parties in the British colonies, dominions and mandated territories cannot be definitively determined, but there are clear indications that the mother Party has retained its senior role among the "Empire" Parties and contains within its national organization one or more departments for colonial work. A "Colonial Branch" under Michael Carritt and the "International Affairs Committee" under R. Palme Dutt are probably both relevant in this connection. The "Conference of Communist Parties of the British Empire" (arranged by CP Great Britain and held in London, February/March 1947) assembled Communist delegates from Australia, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Cyprus, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Malaya, Palestine, South Africa, West Africa, and the West Indies, and underlined again the tutorial position of the mother Party.

More specifically, the Party's relations with individual "colonial" Parties is illustrated in the following:

CP India: During late spring and summer 1947, CP India executed a policy shift from the promotion of revolutionary activity to collaboration with Congress Party governments. This shift was initially advocated at the Empire Conference (February 1947) by R. Palme Dutt who subsequently wrote two articles for People's Age, the official organ of CP India, calling for collaboration between CP India and the Congress Party. From March 1947 on, however, articles appeared in various Soviet periodicals denouncing this policy of collaboration which was formally relinquished by CP India at its Second National Congress (February/March 1948), and then accepted by CP Great Britain. [REDACTED]

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It is perhaps unnecessary to state that the inter-Party relationships in this area are highly complex and no adequate estimate can yet be made of the various patterns of contact of which we have only fragmentary illustration.

Similarly, the Communist movement in the Middle East appears to maintain little organized contact with CP Great Britain. Available evidence is confined to individual correspondence carried on between Iraqi Communists and Party members in the United Kingdom.

b. CP France: A colonial department within the secretariat of CP France is reported to exist currently. It is probable that the national headquarters of the French Party includes staff personnel in charge of colonial work since the strong and well-organized mother Party is in a position to maintain contact with colonial Parties without severe restrictions.

An obvious means of co-ordination is the contact which CP France personnel maintain with the Communist members of the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic who have been elected in French colonial areas. The following colonial Parties or groups are currently represented:

CP Algeria	FAYET, Pierre, National Assembly SPORTISSE, Alice, National Assembly DJEMAAD, Abderrahman, National Assembly MOKHTARI, Mohamed, National Assembly LARRIBERE, Camille, Council of the Republic
CP Guadeloupe	ARCHIMEDE, Gorty, National Assembly GIRARD, Rosan, National Assembly
Ivory Coast	HOUPOUET-BOIGNY, Felix, National Assembly COULIBALYQUEZZIN, National Assembly KABOREZINDA, National Assembly (These three deputies were elected on the ticket of the URR / Union Republicaine et Resistante, a Communist affiliate). FRANCESCHI, Philippe, Council of the Republic GUISOU, Henri, Council of the Republic DJAUMENT, Etienne, Council of the Republic
CP Madagascar	LOMBARDO, Raymond, National Assembly
CP Martinique	BISSOLD, Leopold, National Assembly CESAIRE, Anne, National Assembly SABLE, Victor, Council of the Republic

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CP Reunion	LETERVANCHE, Leon de, National Assembly VERGES, Raymond, National Assembly BARET, Adrien, Council of the Republic COLARDEAU, Fernand, Council of the Republic
Somali	MARTINE, fnu, National Assembly
Somali Coast	DJAMAH, Ali, Council of the Republic
Dahomey	IGNACIO-PINTO, Louis, Council of the Republic
French Indies	SUBBIAH, Council of the Republic PAKIRISSAMI, Council of the Republic
Nigeria	MAIGA, Mohamadon Djibrilla, Council of the Republic

It is reasonable to assume that these colonial fractions have ample opportunity to work closely with the leadership of the metropolitan Party, and may, in their turn, furnish sufficient direction to the local Parties and nuclei so that Communist policy and strategy within the French "empire" is effectively integrated.

CP France also extends its support to Communist front organizations in the colonies, such as the Rassemblement Democratique Africain which was created by Communist deputies from the Ivory Coast, and whose co-ordination committee is located in Paris, receiving direction and funds from metropolitan Party headquarters. Other groups reportedly supported by CP France are the Parti Democratique de l'Independance (Morocco), the Union Democratique du Manifeste Algerien (Algeria), the Vicux Destour and the Neo-Destour (Tunisia), and last but not least, the Viet Minh in Indochina, whose struggle for liberation furnished the metropolitan Party with a noisy propaganda issue and whose delegation in Paris represented a potential contact point with Paris headquarters.

To what extent CP France furnishes substantial organizational support to the colonial Parties or nuclei is largely unknown at present. Reports indicate that propaganda material for French equatorial Africa is shipped out of Marseille. On the other hand, no satisfactory evidence exists on the provision of material support to the Viet Minh.

The relation of CP France to the movement in Syria and Lebanon was substantially affected by the French exodus in 1946. A "Middle East Section" of CP France had up to that time been in

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charge of relations with CP Lebanon and Syria, but in 1946 the Lebanese Party leader Farajallah Hilu traveled to Paris in order to contact the French Party leaders and to clarify their mutual relationships. No evidence has been received since then indicating any significant relations between CP Syria, CP Lebanon and CP France, and it is entirely possible that the influence of CP France is no longer felt in this area.

In the bordering areas of Egypt and Palestine, however, which have never constituted a French colonial sphere, CP France appears to be somewhat active. A direct communication channel is known to exist between Thorez and a linking Egyptian Communist, and the Palestine Communist Party has apparently received guidance from the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in Moscow via the CP France, indicating again that intra-empire relationships are flexible and elastic, and that a colonial Party when "immature" may receive assistance and guidance from several sources.

c. CPUSA: The national jurisdiction of this Party extends over the territory of Alaska. In addition, the small Communist underground organization in Hawaii is controlled by the district (#13) organization of San Francisco; in the Canal Zone Communist elements in the labor movement maintain contact with Communist fractions within the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO); American Communist merchant seamen serve as communication channels with CP Philippines; and CP Puerto Rico co-operates closely with the national headquarters of CPUSA to which it has attached a representative for liaison purposes.

The question must also be raised whether the Parties in Latin America are effectively considered part of the "colonial" sphere of the CPUSA. Intensive interparty relations between CPUSA and the Parties in Central and South America have been constantly noted. A Latin America Commission exists within the national organization of CPUSA, and was headed in 1946 by the chairman of the Party, W. Z. Foster. However, the available evidence is not adequate to indicate the extent to which the

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CPUSA exercises a directive position similar to that of CP Great Britain and France. Obviously, because of its geographical proximity, the CPUSA cannot divorce itself entirely from the Communist movement in the Americas, but if there is any senior Party "guiding" the Parties in Latin America, it is much more likely to be CP France than CPUSA (see next section). This observation leads conveniently to a consideration of another type of relationship frequently blending in with the imperial-colonial pattern.

2. "Senior Party" Support for an Adjacent or Related "Junior Party."

Under the Comintern, Parties within a geographical area facing related political problems were urged to establish close co-operation and were permitted to formalize such close relationships in political federations under Comintern supervision.¹² Such practices fostered integrated political action and are still reflected in the close ties existing between neighboring Parties in Central Europe, Scandinavia, Latin America, the Middle East and the Far East. It is further, almost inevitable that within a regional group of Parties the most mature and best organized Parties should assume a leading position towards the others, providing assistance and guidance by way of informal contacts, consultations, and regular communications.

- a. CP France: As a Latin Party, CP France has apparently become a consultative center for Latin American Parties, a development which may be substantially due to the fact that many Latin American Communists received their education in Paris, obtaining their revolutionary ideas and first contact with the movement there. CP Argentina, according to a statement of a leading Argentinian Communist, maintains close relations with CP France and "people are going back and forth all the time." One Ricardo Enquin, (Russian-born, but a naturalized Argentine) has recently been reported as the permanent representative of CP Argentina in Paris. A leading Brazilian Communist writer, Anibal Machado, left for France in March 1947,

12. The most active of these federations was the Balkan Federation which controlled the Balkan Communist movement and allied organizations from the middle twenties into the late thirties.

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admittedly to discuss matters of mutual interest. The crypto-Communist Bolivian leader of the Partido Izquierda Revolucionario (PIR), Jose Antonin Arzo, arrived in France in December 1947 and was reportedly well-received by Jacques Duclos. Upon his return in July 1948, it became clear that he had brought the PIR into the Communist fold. The secretary-general of CP Uruguay, Eugenio Gomez, who attended the 6th National Congress of CP Italy (January 1948), stayed in Europe until May 1948, and maintained contact with the Central Committee of CP France. Several reports refer to the existence of a Latin American section of CP France through which communications with CP Ecuador are channeled, but these remain unconfirmed.

In similar fashion, CP Belgium has received guidance in recent years by CP France through mutual consultations of leading functionaries and officers of intermediate levels on both sides of the frontier. In June 1947, for example, a meeting took place at the headquarters of CP Belgium, where members of the Belgian Central Committee met with representatives of CP France to discuss the co-ordination of action against the Social Democrats and the synchronization of future strike movements.

Communication machinery linking CP France with CP Germany in the Western Zones is currently under investigation, and it may well be that CP France plays a greater role in the co-ordination of the West European Parties than is generally accepted.

b. CP Belgium: Special services that may be performed by a stronger Party for its neighbors are illustrated by the assistance given to CP Holland and CP Germany by CP Belgium. When CP Holland determined to oppose sending troops to Indonesia, CP Belgium volunteered to find jobs for Dutch deserters through its dock workers' organization in Antwerp. Assistance given to CP Germany (British Zone) currently consists not only in the supply of propaganda material printed in France, but also in such practical help as "rest cures" for ailing German Communists in Antwerp.

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c. CP Syria and Lebanon: These two Parties, which until 1944 formed a single organization, served as centers of aid and assistance in the Middle East prior to their suppression in the winter of 1947-48. CP Lebanon maintained liaison with the Arab League of National Liberation (ALNL) in Palestine and Communist groups in Transjordan and Egypt, furnishing funds to ALNL, and literature to both ALNL and Egyptian organizations. CP Syria, which itself was closely guided by CP Lebanon, supported the Communist movement in Iraq.

Because of its close relations with the Soviet Legation in Beirut (see below), CP Lebanon also acted as a channel for Soviet communications to other Parties.

d. CP India: CP India virtually directs the Burma Communist Party (White Flag), and the publishing house of CP India furnishes the bulk of propaganda literature for Burma. Similarly, CP Ceylon maintains constant contact with CP India.

e. CP China: On the basis of extremely fragmentary evidence, CP China, in conjunction with the various Chinese Communist Parties in other areas of the Far East, appears occasionally to perform the functions of a "senior party." Prior to the end of World War II, Yen'an provided refuge for exiled Japanese and Annamite Communists, notably for Nozaka Sanzo, also known as "Susumu," the Japanese Comintern functionary. The Communist-controlled Viet Minh in French Indo-China is reportedly supported by the local Chinese Communist organization. The Philippine Communist Party has received guidance and financial assistance from North China and Hongkong. CP China has assisted the Party in North Korea by providing refuge for exiles, training in military units, and transportation for returning personnel.

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13. The existence of a South China Bureau, a sub-agency of the Politburo of CP China, in Hong Kong has been reported. This Bureau may represent a liaison center for Chinese Communists in South China and South East Asia but little supporting evidence is available.

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3. Support of "Host Party" for Exiled "Guest Party." Parties driven into exile by police persecution maintain their organizational integrity and independence abroad in order to direct and assist the remaining underground elements at home, and to return to their homelands whenever conditions have again become favorable. In exile, however, the foreign central committees, fronts and other groups can in most cases maintain their organizations only with the active assistance of the Party of the host country. Such was the case with the old Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in the days before the Russian revolution, and with the Italian Communist Party during the Mussolini era. Similarly, before and during the war the German Communist Party groups in exile (Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Mexico City, etc.) enjoyed the support of their "host" Parties to an extreme degree; e.g., Danish Communists acted as underground couriers to Germany for their German comrades in exile.

a. CP Spain: The Central Committee and headquarters of CP Spain are located in Paris. CP France acts in an advisory capacity, co-ordinates local political activities of CP Spain in France and probably provides some financial support. The activities of the Spanish Communist colonies in Latin America (infiltration of non-Communist Spanish organizations, collection of funds) are actively supported by CP Uruguay, CP Argentina, and CP Mexico. CP Chile reportedly made a substantial contribution in 1947 to the treasury of Spanish headquarters in Paris.

b. CP Portugal: Headquarters of the "exiled Portuguese Communist Party" were reportedly established in Paris during 1946, but further information is lacking.

c. CP Greece: In the particularly complicated case of CP Greece (KKE) the "host" function has been assumed primarily by the neighboring Party-Governments of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, which furnish military training facilities, personnel and supplies, bases for operations and transportation, broadcasting and medical supplies for the rebel forces and safe haven and transportation for Party leaders. However, other

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Parties within the Soviet satellite belt of Eastern Europe are participating in the aid program for KKE through various organizations of the "Aid to Greek Democracy" type by engaging in fund collecting and similar "charitable" activities. CP France, CP Belgium and other Western Parties have joined in the specific program and the international Party press has made full use of the propagandistic values of the Greek case, thus illustrating the fact that large segments of the world movement as well as the Party of the country actually harboring the exiled Party leadership may be called upon to assist the expatriates. This system of world-wide aid to a Party in need was formalized through the creation of an International Co-ordination Committee on the occasion of the International Conference for Aid to Greece in Paris, April 1948.

C. Clandestine Communication Methods

Since the maintenance of interparty relations, perfectly normal from the point of view of the Parties concerned, is considered quite otherwise by individual "bourgeois" governments and police agencies, all Communist Parties have worked out measures designed to camouflage certain aspects of their communications with each other. They have, of course, considered such clandestine practices necessary in the case of Parties operating underground, but "legal" Parties as well resort to clandestine or semi-clandestine communications. As a descriptive analysis of the complicated communication methods of underground Parties does not fall within the scope of this paper, some of the more generally encountered practices are briefly noted below:

1. Interparty Correspondence. As has been pointed out previously, it can be accepted that significant communications between Parties are normally not put on paper, and documents purporting to contain "orders" or "instructions" from one Party to another have thus far been generally found to be forged. Although written communications can be forwarded by couriers (see below), with the additional protection of codes and secret ink, verbal transmission is obviously the more secure method. Occasionally,

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however, the open mails are utilized for the transmission of routine
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 communications, and in this connection the use of certain protective
 tricks has been noted.

- a. Cover Addresses: In the correspondence carried on by Pedro Saad, leading figure of CP Ecuador, with Jorge del Prado, secretary general/CP Peru, letters from Saad are addressed to the wife of del Prado, and similarly, mail from del Prado is forwarded to a cover address in Ecuador.
- b. Circumvention of Censorship: Censorship conditions are frequently circumvented. In Chile, for example, international air mail is not opened. Consequently, Party correspondence from Cuba, Mexico, and Colombia is air mailed to an addressee in Chile, and from there is carried by hand to a border town in Peru. It is then roaddressed and forwarded by domestic air mail to its destination in Peru. Similarly, Communist mail from Chile is sometimes brought by hand across the Peruvian border and mailed in Peru directly.
- c. Infiltration of Post Office: Mail addressed to Communists is pigeonholed by the Communist cell in the post office in Quito, Ecuador. It has been ascertained that these Communist postal employees extract the letters of their comrades and Party functionaries from the mails for personal distribution.

2. Couriers. In view of the preponderance of verbal transmission,
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 couriers are standard communication vehicles among the Parties. They are frequently selected on an incidental basis from among trustworthy Party members traveling under normal "cover" of their business or overt

14. The CP Peru, e.g., received in July 1948 several of such routine communications through the open mail: a communication from the World Federation of Trade Unions setting out the dates of international meetings to be held in 1948; a letter from CPUSA containing the latter's electoral platform; a reminder from CP Spain to celebrate the Tenth Anniversary of the proclamation of national union.
15. The preponderantly oral character of Communist communications has been confirmed recently by a reliable report from sources in CP Germany, stating that important communications from the Russian Zone to the Party in the West (briefings, instructions) are always transmitted orally by special couriers, and that only uncompromising routine material is put on paper.

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Party function. Permanent liaison functions may be entrusted to special, permanent couriers who, for security reasons, may even be detached from the Party. Among the natural covers for international contacts the maritime profession is ideal and has been extensively employed from the earliest days of the movement.

a. Maritime Couriers. The International of Seamen and Harborworkers (ISH), created by the Comintern and operating up to 1933 from Hamburg and later from harbor cities in Scandinavia and the Lowlands, constituted a first attempt to organize, unionize and utilize on an international basis Communist elements in the dock and harbor areas of the world as well as in the "bourgeois" merchant marines and navies, primarily in order to create an international sabotage, intelligence and strike organization capable of crippling marine communications and supply lines in case of war against the Soviet Union, but also in order to build up an international communication service for the Comintern. In spite of the apparent dissolution of the ISH, national Parties in countries with maritime services continue to place great emphasis on the organization of waterfront sections and on the penetration or, where possible, outright control of maritime unions. Again, as under the Comintern, the basic approach is political, aiming at political control over maritime workers and unions for strategic revolutionary use on the national scene. Obviously, the international contacts of seafaring Communists also provide their Parties with easily exploitable communication channels. In this respect, it should be pointed out that a Communist engaged in maritime work abroad represents his Party in a general sense, and more or less symbolically of the action solidarity of the international movement, viz, he participates in the activities of the Party located in the country visited. US Communist seamen, e.g., are directed not to neglect Party work when ashore in foreign ports. They are instructed to contact local Party headquarters and work actively with the foreign Party in question by donating money, swapping literature, exchanging experience,

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etc. Such activities can obviously not be classified as courier business in a technical sense--they merely exemplify the typical international responsibilities of any Party member working abroad. In this sense the words of the American Communist Earl Browder characterize the general function of Communist seamen, i.e., "Seamen are the most basic section of the working class, the Communist Party cherishes and is proud of them. They are the truly international members of our Party and the vanguard of the vanguard. They are socialists at heart, internationalists by occupation, the backbone of international workers' solidarity and the leaders of the revolution throughout the world." Over and above these traditional connections of Communist maritime waterfront elements all over the globe, there is evidence that seafaring Communists have been generally assigned specific clandestine courier and contact missions in the postwar period. In the Western Hemisphere, Communist members of US maritime unions have been found to maintain contact between CPUSA and CP Philippines as well as Communist groups in Panama. An attempt to set up a permanent maritime courier service between CPUSA and the west coast of Latin America was reported in January 1948 when a member of the Central Committee of CP Peru and secretary of the Port and Dock Workers Union was visited by a crew member of the Santa Luisa (Grace Line) in order to discuss plans for the establishment of a liaison service covering Peru, Chile, Colombia and Panama, the service to be performed by Grace Line crew members. International maritime couriers have reportedly visited the coastal regions of Ecuador and brought "instructions" to regional headquarters of which even the national leadership of CP Ecuador was unaware.

In the Far East, the CP Japan has been utilizing Communist members in the Japan Seamen's Union, especially those working on repatriation vessels, for liaison purposes with the mainland. According to reliable documents, CP Japan also issued a call for Korean Communists who have knowledge of the shorelines of

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North Korea and who can operate small boats. The CP Indonesia relies for its international contacts upon the Indonesian Sailors Union (SARFELINDO) which is headed by the chairman of CP Indonesia. In Australia, the secretary of the Indian Seamen's Union, Clarence Hart Campbell, is an avowed Communist, vice president of the Australian-Indonesian Association and vice president of the Australian-Indian Association, and it is more than likely that this individual utilizes his maritime contacts for liaison purposes.

In Europe, the return of Ernst Friedrich Wollweber, wartime head of the ISH, from the USSR to a leading position in the Shipping Division of the Central Transport Administration in Berlin leaves the possibility open that this seasoned revolutionary has been charged again with the organization of international maritime work. According to Wollweber himself, his present office is merely a cover for "more important political work," and available evidence indicates that the former ISH head is engaged in the organization of clandestine courier routes on the waterways of Europe, as well as with Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It must, however, be stated that there is no indication as yet for the existence of a postwar organization comparable to the ISH, exerting controls over the maritime sections of Communist Parties. On the other hand, it may be accepted that the general concept of Communist maritime work which includes sabotage, intelligence and communication operations, has not changed, and that Communist seamen continue to be active not only as informal participants in the waterfront activities of foreign Parties, but also as special Party couriers.

b. Courier Systems. In addition to the use of individual couriers, some Parties have organized well-developed courier systems in order to ensure the safety of routine communication and the movement of bodies, funds and propaganda literature across geographical boundaries. The need for such courier systems varies, of course, with the political climate in which

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the Parties operate, and with the existing facilities for unhampered communication between Party leaders. No clear-cut pattern has been discovered as to the organizational responsibility within each Party for the running of international couriers or courier systems, but it is strongly suspected that the organization and personnel (cadre) departments have a pivotal function in this respect.

A particularly well developed courier system has been reported from occupied Germany, linking the Eastern and Western zones. Direction and co-ordination of the courier system appears to be centralized within the central secretariat of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in Berlin under one Richard Stahlmann, a leading German Communist formerly employed by the Comintern. Within the British Zone each Landesleitung and Bezirksleitung of the CP Germany (KPD)--the highest and second highest echelons--maintains direct, and in the cases of a Landesleitung, daily communications with SED headquarters. Responsibility for the courier system within the British Zone appears to be centered in the respective cadre departments, while in the US Zone the courier route Frankfurt-Weimar is reportedly controlled by the chief of the organization department of Land headquarters in Frankfurt. The movements of these couriers follow definite clandestine routes, equipped with safe houses, resting places and guides for border crossings. Nine such routes have been identified as linking the British with the Russian Zone, and three routes connecting the US Zone with the East. This clandestine courier system serves for the infiltration of propaganda material from the East, the movement of KPD leaders across zonal borders for conferences with the SED, the passage of students to and from indoctrination courses in the Russian Zone, and even for the smuggling of cigarettes, spirits and money destined for Party members.

Various other instances of international courier networks have come to notice: German Communists, who spent the

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years of exile in Holland and Belgium and are therefore well connected with the comrades in these countries, organized routes for passing Dutch army deserters to Czechoslovakia, and for German Communists to spend periods of "convalescence" in Belgium. A fairly effective courier system operates between Chile, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador. CP Ecuador reportedly assigned the treasurer of its coastal regional committee as the key contact man for all international couriers arriving in Guayaquil.

In reviewing the enormous volume and variety of interparty connections ranging from constant exchange of information to mutual assistance and common regional deliberations within frameworks of geographical proximity and common political problems, the postwar internationalism of the Communist movement in organizational as well as ideological terms emerges with abundant clarity. Even from this analysis, based on no more than a surface layer of evidence, it is clear that no Communist Party operates in isolation from the rest of the movement, and that, quantitatively speaking, untold opportunities exist for the mutual solution of local and regional Party affairs--exceptions from this rule are rare (e.g., the recent complaint of CP Australia about the lack of co-ordination with CP Great Britain). It is nonetheless clear that the significance of postwar interparty relations cannot be properly determined in quantitative terms alone. Although it is indispensable for the growth and survival of individual Parties that they act in concert with, and are assisted by, a maximal number of other parties, mutually reinforcing their political and action potential, there is nothing to show that in the postwar period the multitudinous and variegated forms of interparty contacts add up to more than local or regional significance, roughly comparable to the necessary horizontal co-ordination between units of any large business enterprise or army. On the other hand, it is obvious that the strategic direction of the entire international movement in ideological as well as, to a lesser extent, organizational terms continues to be determined in the postwar period by the CPSU itself, and that the significant events in international Party life of the past five years have consisted in the adjustment (or non-adjustment, as in the case of CP Yugoslavia) made by

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local Parties to the new "swing to the left" developed in progressive stages by the Soviet Party from the Battle of Stalingrad on at least up to spring 1948. During this crystallization period of the new strategy which superseded the basic policy line promulgated by the last World Congress of the Comintern (1935), there has been no case of any international policy initiative independently taken by a Party outside the USSR. The national Communist Parties of the world, although they are working as closely together as in the days of the Comintern, are still dependent upon the CPSU insofar as the delineation of international strategy is concerned. They may be considered "independent" merely in the local or regional application of international policies or organizational problems.

The "normal" horizontal interconnections and interparty relations practiced by the movement in the postwar period accordingly in no way preclude the existence of a vertical command system stemming from CPSU itself. An appreciation of the organizational mechanisms of this vertical chain of command will be presented in the final section of this paper. First, however, certain misconceptions regarding regional control media employed by the CPSU need to be cleared up.

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~~SECRET~~III. REGIONAL CONTROL CENTERS

During the past three years frequent allegations have been made on the existence of individuals, "bureaus" or "centers" in various parts of the world exercising directive control over several Parties, and operating as a forward echelon of the CPSU steering apparatus. These statements have rarely been supported even by purported facts and in many cases simply appear to be automatic projections of the pre-war organization of the Comintern. It is nevertheless useful to examine such evidence as is available in order to clarify precisely how a "regional center" is to be defined and what its exact function is.

In Communist organizational terms a regional control center is a permanent international agency, large or small, operating--usually clandestinely--within the territory of a national Communist Party with formal jurisdiction over several Parties. It is directly responsible to an international control center from which it derives its authority and on whose behalf it supervises, directs and assists the Parties under its jurisdiction, either by exercising discretionary powers or by serving merely as a relay station (for funds, instructions) for the central organization. This type of field control was developed by the Comintern within the framework of a rigid international control system necessitating the creation of field relay stations as outlets for the headquarters organization which, up to the middle thirties, was faced with the problem of creating mass Parties and self-reliant leaders abroad, and needed, during this period, strong executive offices in the field.

The direction of the national Parties by the Comintern was supported and bolstered by a series of international regional organizations--permanent bureaus--which operated clandestinely as field agencies of the Third International. The permanent bureaus represented an intermediate echelon between Moscow headquarters and the sections of the world Party. Their jurisdiction was genuinely international as it extended over groups of Parties which, in their turn, were obliged to execute the orders of the permanent bureaus. In administrative terms, the permanent bureaus were also international: they were staffed by Comintern personnel, maintained their own communication channels with Moscow, and were responsible to the ECCI alone. Their functions were indicated by their designation since

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the term "bureau" in Communist parlance denotes an executive-administrative agency. Thus, the "permanent bureaus" served mainly as relay stations for funds and instructions; they rendered operational assistance to the national Parties, selected and transported students to training centers in the USSR, and were generally involved in the control of the clandestine activities of the Parties under their jurisdiction. Varying in size,¹⁶ the permanent bureaus of the Comintern represented the prototype of regional control centers inasmuch as they were organized on a permanent basis, comprised a working staff concerned with the day-to-day control of the Parties under their jurisdiction, and operated under a tight cover of their own without any connection with official or semiofficial Soviet installations abroad which they apparently relieved of Party control functions in the field.

In addition to the system of bureaus, the Comintern also used individuals to exercise field controls. Authorized Comintern representatives were frequently dispatched by the ECCI to Parties abroad where they, known only to a few initiated leaders, directed both legal and illegal Party affairs. Comintern instructors, specialists in various fields of Party work, were also regularly sent out in order to organize and control specific phases of Communist activities.

Since it is a well-established fact that the Comintern's field control system as such had gone out of business before the war, it is at least a debatable question whether there has been any real need felt by the CPSU leadership for the re-establishment of such supranational agencies in the field. In large areas the CPSU is in direct control: Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the occupation belt in Germany, Austria, and Korea do not require formalized regional direction any longer. CP Italy and France have reached a considerable degree of "maturity" and obviously do not require constant and total supervision. The highly successful CP China, with unhampered communication lines reaching into the USSR, has similarly passed beyond the stage where intermediate tutelage is necessary. It can safely be accepted that the strongest and

16. The Western European Bureau stationed in Berlin before 1933 was reportedly staffed by 500 members. The Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai (1931) had a staff of nine Europeans.

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most significant postwar Parties in the world movement do not require a rigid, conspiratorial regional control system for maximum efficiency. As for the less "mature" Parties, it is clear, for example, that field control in the Middle East has been assumed by official Soviet installations using CP Lebanon and Syria as transmission vehicles-- a further indication that the concept of formalized regional centers has been abandoned, at least in this area.

Whatever the theoretical usefulness of regional centers for the world movement in the postwar period, currently available evidence does not support the reports that have cropped up in all corners of the globe, ascribing vague international controlling functions to supra-party agencies operating abroad. With the exception of the Cominform (see below), no organized regional control center has been discovered functioning anywhere; no international working staff employed or authorized by the CPSU leadership has been identified; and no relationship of Parties other than routine interparty relationships and direct contacts with the CPSU can be at all adequately proved. The following critical review of available evidence concerning purported "regional centers" active in the postwar period clearly indicates the tenuous grounds upon which the existence of a formalized Soviet field control system has been based.

A. Purported Regional Center in Paris

The spectacular growth of CP France after World War II has occasioned many intelligence sources and observers to maintain that Paris has become a control center for the international movement not unlike pre-Hitler Berlin which harbored the main forward station of the Comintern, the Western European Bureau. While it is unquestionable that CP France has assumed a status roughly similar to that held by CP Germany before Hitler, it is highly questionable that the leadership of the French Party has been assigned formal control functions on behalf of the CPSU. CP France, more particularly its Politburo and within it Duclos, have figured largely both in journalistic and confidential source speculation as "an operational center of international Communist agents," "Center for Western democracies," seat of an "International Communist Co-ordination Committee" which sent instructions to CPUSA over Duclos' signature, "central headquarters

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of the actively functioning, but officially non-existent, Comintern," etc. Frequent and similarly speculative reports have described Paris as the point of origin for Party "directives" and instructions sent not only to the Lowlands and Iberian Parties, but also to Latin American Parties, to CP Great Britain, and to CPUSA. Such reports entirely disregard the existence of normal interparty relationships (see above), particularly the various advisory and consultative functions which CP France exercises towards other Parties in Europe, Africa, and Latin America as a result of its advanced position in the international class struggle, and by virtue of its responsibilities towards colonial Parties within the French Empire. The manifold international activities may appear to superficial observation as evidence for a clearly defined international command function, but upon closer scrutiny the "evidence" boils down to the following facts: CP France has maintained its directing role toward its colonial sister Parties, and acts in an advisory and assisting capacity to the central organization of CP Spain and CP Portugal, exiled in France. CP Belgium and probably CP Germany in the Western Zones maintain close consultative relations with the French Party. Several Latin American Parties gravitate toward Paris for guidance. In addition, fractions of CP France have assumed leading functions in such international front organizations as the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Federation of Democratic Women, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Co-ordination Committee established by the International Conference for Aid to Greece. Many other, non-French Communist-dominated organizations are located in France and obviously consult with CP France personnel, among them the now illegal Union of Soviet Citizens, as well as Greek, Rumanian, Hungarian, Polish and other foreign fronts. The political stature of the French Party is further accentuated by the high international rating of its theoretical magazine, La Democratie Nouvelle, and by the constant visits of foreign Party functionaries, European and non-European, to Paris. Viewed quite objectively, these relationships leave little support for the popular postwar concept that specific personnel within CP France have been assigned by the CPSU to direct a number of foreign Parties. This statement is not meant to minimize the scope of the international connections of CP France, but merely to place their

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organizational significance in proper perspective. It should also be noted that fairly reliable evidence indicates that the Jewish section of CP France in conjunction with the "Union des Juifs pour la Resistance et l'Entraide" in Paris serves as a communication channel between the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in Moscow and the Palestine Communist Party.¹⁷

The incidental use of the French Party's communication facilities on behalf of the CPSU, however, cannot serve to substantiate the existence of a clandestine regional control center within CP France. Even the standard piece of evidence usually quoted to demonstrate the directive role of CP France can no longer be regarded as valid, the part played by Duclos in the Browder fight. Duclos, whose attack on Earl Browder in Cahiers du Communisme (April 1945) led to the latter's expulsion from the CPUSA, is now believed to have acted individually on behalf of CPSU after the Soviet center had been unsuccessful in its attempts to oust Browder through direct communication with the CPUSA and found itself forced (as in the case of Tito) to marshal world Communist opinion against the American leader.

Similarly inconclusive or unverified are the following pieces of information: a letter intercepted in Berlin in 1945 addressed by the French Politburo to the German Party on stationery with the heading "Comintern"; various hearsay reports on the existence of an "International Communist Co-ordination Committee" or "International Marxist Committee" headed by Duclos; statements that Duclos issued instructions to CPUSA in 1946; reports to the effect that a Latin American Committee (or Section) of the CP France was established and sent instructions to CP Ecuador; statements that the Communist PSD (Socialist Democratic Party) of Colombia received instructions in 1947 via Mexico and Cuba from a "Communist center" in Paris located at the headquarters of CP Spain, signed by Andre Marty (CP France) and Dolores Ibarruri and Santiago Carrillo (CP Spain).

It can tentatively be estimated that CP France, a Party rather seriously concerned with the acquisition of national power, has not been assigned the technical task of directing other Parties. The variety and volume of its informal, international relations have heretofore merely confused the issue. The fact remains, however, that Paris is an important informal contact center of international Communism.

17. One Koenig is reported to be representative of the Jewish Anti-Fascist committee attached to CP France.

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~~SECRET~~D. Other Purported Regional Centers in Europe

Among other European capitals purportedly harboring regional centers, frequently with conflicting or overlapping jurisdiction, are Prague, pro-Cominform Belgrade and Copenhagen, but as in the case of Paris, no supporting evidence exists for such allegations.

1. Prague. No evidence is currently available to substantiate the claims, rather frequent in 1946-47, that Prague is a "center for Western Europe." Statements to that effect included the usual vague references to a "Department of the Third International" allegedly controlling the "Greek Democratic Army"; to instructions for Western European Parties originating in Prague; to the "chief central outside of the USSR" existing in Prague, and so on.

2. Belgrade. Prior to the establishment of the Cominform, Yugoslavia had been variously reported as the seat of a suboffice of the Agitprop Department of the CPSU (the "Latin Horizontal") in control of CP Italy, and as harboring in Belgrade a "Central Committee of the Balkan Communist Parties," allegedly charged with submitting recommendations to the CC/CPSU on problems of policy and political strategy common to all Communist Parties of the Balkans. Occasionally rumors were spread about a "Central Executive Committee of the Balkan Section of the Communist International" or a "Supreme European Communist Council" in Belgrade—these apparently reflected the fact that the vociferous Yugoslav CP, either through the Pan-Slav Committee or through Yugoslav diplomatic installations abroad, had actively attempted to control or penetrate the Yugoslav elements abroad.

3. Copenhagen. Reports that "Communist headquarters for Scandinavia" were established in Copenhagen early in 1947 remain unconfirmed. However, several recent reliable reports indicate that Rikard Aage Jensen, Danish Communist and former Comintern agent, acts as some kind of CPSU representative within CP Denmark. Jensen, who was active in the secret communications service of the Comintern before the war, allegedly reports to Moscow information collected on the activities of CP Denmark by an agent of his within the CP Denmark leadership. An unidentified agency in Moscow has been reported as channeling its directives to CP Denmark through Jensen. Axel Larsen, leader of CP Denmark, reportedly deals with

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Jensen without the knowledge of his (Larson's) comrades, recognizing Jensen's overriding position. Although Jensen may well be a representative of the CPSU, final judgment on his exact status must await further investigation.


C. Purported Regional Centers in Latin America

Almost every Latin American country in which either an official Soviet installation or a Party has existed during the postwar period has been credited with harboring an "international" directing office exercising jurisdiction over the entire continent. Two such bodies were reported from Uruguay, viz., a "Commission de Enlace Para Sudamerica" (Liaison Committee for South America) under Rodney Arismendi, and an organization with the somewhat bombastic title "Soviet Revolutionary Continental Movement." In Havana, Cuba, there allegedly exists a successor organization to the Latin American and Caribbean Bureau of the Comintern, entitled "Buro Politico Sudamericano," staffed with leading Cuban Communists.¹⁸

From Mexico have come statements that Trotzky's murderer Mornard @ Jackson directs the entire movement in Latin America from his cell in jail(1); that there existed in 1945 a successor organization to "The Western Bureau of the Comintern"(1) with Vicente Lombardo Toledano in charge of its labor department and second in command of all activities under the former Soviet Ambassador to Mexico, Umansky.¹⁹ It has similarly been reported that Vittorio Codovilla, secretary general of CP Argentina, is the director of all Communist activities in Latin America, that he planned to organize a Communist center in Chile, and that another center for Latin America exists in Bogota, Colombia.

18. The reports in question simply "assign" functions in the bureau to such well-known leaders as Blas Roca, Lazaro Pena, et al., who by virtue of their standing, experience, and contacts are in the public limelight. No specific evidence of any international activities beyond the "normal" functions of these individuals has been supplied.

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~~SECRET~~D. Purported Regional Centers in the Far East

The same pattern of speculative and unverified reporting prevails in the Far East. It has been variously reported that the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern has been revived; that there exist two regional organizations for Asia, viz., the "Chung Gung" for China, Korea, Indo-China, Siam, and the "Ma Gung" for Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines; that Tran van Giau, vice-president of the Southeast Asia League, is the secretary general of a so-called "Office of the Pacific" in Bangkok, an alleged directing center for Southeast Asia; etc.

It may be fairly concluded that the weight of available evidence is against the existence of secret regional field agencies of the CPSU, whether integrated with a foreign Party or operating independently. The CPSU leadership has apparently relinquished the regional control of foreign Parties as it had been developed by the Comintern. With the Cominform, however, a new experiment in regional control has been initiated, joining the CPSU and a group of foreign Parties into an intermediate regional organization, instead of leaving control of a regional agency entirely in the hands of the center as before. The following section will analyze the organizational significance of this new, "democratized" regional center.

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~~SECRET~~IV. THE COMINFORM

In assessing the organizational significance of the Cominform at this point, rather than in conjunction with the analysis still to be made of the extent of direct Soviet controls over foreign Parties, the two facts to be emphasized are that the Cominform represents a traditional type of regional organization which simply formalizes the interrelations of a group of Parties, and that it provides a public means for the CPSU to exercise direct control of a group of key Parties. At this moment it is still impossible to present a specific, organizational assessment of the present and projected functions of this new agency, but the primary intent underlying its creation and the compass of its present authority can be tentatively evaluated.

Two statements are available from which the professed intention of the founders of the Cominform may be gauged: one made by Zhdanov at the founding conference in Poland (September 1947), the other by Palmiro Togliatti at a closed session of the cadre of the Rome federation (July 1948). Zhdanov, who, as representative of CPSU, formulated both the policy and the action program of the Cominform, referred particularly to the need for better co-ordination of action in view of the growing conflict between the "imperialist camp," led by the U.S., and the "anti-imperialist camp", led by the USSR. Defining the policy of all Communist Parties -- "to lead the resistance to the U.S. plan for the enslavement of Europe, to unmask all the home supporters of U.S. imperialism"--Zhdanov suggested that this policy required specific implementation through concerted action and action machinery. Referring to the dissolution of the Comintern, he pointed out that "the Comintern was founded after World War I when the Communist Parties were still weak, when there was hardly any connection between the working classes of different countries, and when the Communist Parties did not as yet have leaders...enjoying general recognition." Creating conditions "for young Communist Parties to develop into mass labor parties," The Comintern outlived its purpose when these Parties grew into mass Parties, and direction from one center became "both impossible and inexpedient." Since the dissolution of the Comintern "a considerable strengthening of the Communist Parties has taken place in almost every country in Europe and Asia." However, Zhdanov continued, "there are draw-

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backs in the present position of the Communist Parties. Some comrades conceived the notion that the dissolution of the Comintern meant the liquidation of all ties, of all contact between the fraternal Communist Parties. Experience has shown, however, that such dissociation between Communist Parties is erroneous, injurious and essentially unnatural. The Communist movement is developing within national frameworks, but at the same time it has problems and interests common to Parties of different countries..... Need for consultation and voluntary co-ordination of action on the part of the various Parties has become especially opportune now when continued dissociation might lead to a weakening of mutual understanding and sometimes to serious errors."

Togliatti, in his off-the-record talk almost a year later, stated more specifically, "It was in fact established when the Cominform was set up that each Communist Party should keep its brother Parties informed of its own internal situation as well as of every item of information which concerned its own country. Each Party further reserved the right to criticize the other Parties and to accept criticism made by them." These statements can be accepted as a reasonably accurate reflection of general intent, viz., to join the nine founding Parties (USSR, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, France, Italy) into an organization for the pooling of experience and information, and to work out policy problems in joint consultation--in the language of the resolution drawn up at the founding conference, "for the purpose of organizing the exchange of experience and, in case of necessity, co-ordination of action of Communist Parties on the basis of mutual agreement." The emphasis on "mutual agreement" points to a concept of "democratic" procedure by which decisions, whenever they become necessary, may be arrived at through a free vote of representatives speaking for the affiliated Parties.

For a fuller understanding of the genesis and intent of the Cominform, it may be pointed out additionally that several months before the creation of the Cominform on the occasion of the 30th Anniversary of Lenin's April (1917) theses, Pravda (April 1947) underscored significantly the applicability of those theses to the current world situation. Briefly, Lenin maintained that the Russian revolution was in a transitional stage between bourgeois and proletarian rule, endangered by capitalist promises and

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concessions, and disrupted by social democratic trends toward moderation and nationalism. Lenin, however, taking an intransigent position, demanded creation of a Soviet Republic by revolutionary means, nationalization of land, banks and syndicates, and last but not least, the creation of a new Communist International. There can be little doubt about the applicability, in Marxist terms, of Lenin's April theses to the current situation in Europe in view of the correspondence of the present Soviet position vis-a-vis the social democratic problem, the problem of collectivization, and the role of Communist Parties in general. Faced with the growing threat of a "relative stabilization of capitalism in Europe promoted by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the Soviet leaders and particularly Zhdanov, the most conspicuous representative of neo-Leninism, may well have heeded Lenin's old demand for a "new International" in order to prevent the strengthening of "bourgeois rule." The fact that the Cominform, according to available evidence, is by no means a mechanical duplication or approximation of the defunct Comintern illustrates the current approach of the Soviet leaders toward the problem of controlling foreign Parties. Through the Cominform they created an organizational structure where it had become strategically imperative: in Eastern Europe, France and Italy.

A. Organization

Only a few acceptable facts stand out from among the mass of speculative and unverified reports concerning the working organization of the "Information Bureau of Communist and Workers Parties." There is no evidence whatever to back up reports from journalists and confidential sources on the existence of an elaborate clandestine organization within the Cominform; e.g., reports that separate sections have been set up to deal with army, propaganda, colonial and youth affairs, staffed by such appropriate personnel as Ilya Ehrenburg, former Ambassador to the U.S. Novikov, secretary of the WFDY Guy de Boisson, etc. More elaborate fabrications have added sections for information and documentation, nationalities, trade unions, finances, administration. A highly dubious document purporting to contain the minutes of a secret meeting at the founding conference describes a special committee (Defense Active des Partis Communistes Italiens et Francais) independently co-ordinating the revolutionary activities of the French and Italian Parties under the direct jurisdiction of the Politburo/CPSU. "Protocol M" has

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been clearly established as a forgery, and several intercepted "documents" on Cominform activities in the Far East are of equally dubious origin. It is perhaps unnecessary to recall the voluminous and misleading coverage of "secret" Comintern affairs which found an equally ready market between the two wars.

In the present state of our knowledge it can be stated that the current organizational structure of the Cominform is confined to an "Information Bureau" and a Permanent Editorial Board, the latter in charge of the Cominform journal For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! These two components require separate discussion..

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1. The Information Bureau. A joint agency of eight of the founding Parties, the "Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties," according to the ambiguous language of the founding conference, is to include two representatives from the Central Committees of the affiliated Parties. It has been assigned the task of "organizing the exchange of experience and, in case of necessity, the task of co-ordinating the activities of Communist Parties on the basis of mutual agreement." Its functions accordingly comprise the making of policy decisions and the collection of information.

The policy-making function of the Information Bureau first manifested itself at the founding conference (Poland, September 1947), when the participating Parties issued a declaration which formulated the world-wide Communist policy of resistance to "U.S. imperialism" and its capitalist and Social Democratic allies. The Cominform resolution of 28 June 1948, concerning the internal situation of CP Yugoslavia, illustrated again that the Cominform is to be considered, at least by its affiliated Parties, as a supreme policy-making authority with considerable disciplinary power. By now, there is little doubt left that affiliation with the Cominform means recognition of a supraparty organization with executive power and certain means of enforcement (political ostracism, or when feasible, Soviet and satellite governmental pressure).²¹ Doubt, however,

20. The status of the ninth founding Party, CP Yugoslavia, is at present in suspense.

21. See the statement in the June resolution, viz., "It is known to all that when organizing the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties the irrefutable principle was laid down as its basis that every Party should be accountable to the Information Bureau, just as every Party has the right to criticize other Parties." To what extent the June resolution is enforceable in the future remains to be seen.

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still exists as to the actual proceedings by which policy decisions are made, and as to the effective radius of such decisions, i.e., to what extent they are binding on non-Cominform Parties.

In regard to policy decisions, the question must be raised whether a staff of policy makers has been assembled in the Cominform offices. Judging again from official statements, it is estimated that no such staff has been employed on a permanent basis. The observable procedure for policy-making decisions has so far consisted in meetings of Central Committee representatives from the affiliated Parties, called into session whenever the occasion arose. However, the three "public" Cominform meetings concerned with policy decisions have not been attended by the same delegates:

I September 1947 <u>Poland</u>	II January 1948 <u>Belgrade</u>	III June 1948 <u>Rumania</u>
<u>USSR:</u>		
A.A. ZHDANOV G.M. MALENKOV	P.F. YUDIN V.G. GRIGORYAN	A.A. ZHDANOV G.M. MALENKOV M.A. SUSLOV
<u>Bulgaria:</u>		
V. CHERVENKOV V. POPTOMOV	V. POPTOMOV	V. CHERVENKOV T. KOSTOV
<u>Rumania:</u>		
A.M. PAUKER G. GHEORGHIU-DEJ	J. CHISHINEVSKY L. RAUTU	A.M. PAUKER G. GHEORGHIU-DEJ V. LUKA
<u>Hungary:</u>		
M. FARKAS J. REVAI	M. HORVATH Z. BIRO	M. RAKOSI M. FARKAS E. GEROE
<u>Poland:</u>		
W. GOMULKA H. MINC	Z. KLISZKO J. FINKELSTEIN	J. DERMAN A.L. ZAVADSKI
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>		
R. SLANSKY S. DASHKOVANSKY	B. VODA-PEKSA B. GEMINDER	R. SLANSKY B. GEMINDER V. SIROKY G. BARES
<u>Yugoslavia:</u>		
E. KARDELJ M. DJILAS	I. GOSNJAK D. ZIHNERL	-

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E. FAJONA. LECOEUR
P. HENIGESJ. DUCLOS
E. FAJONItaly:L. LONGO
E. REALED. ROSSI
G. PAJETTAP. TOGLIATTI
P. SECCHIA

The fact that the January meeting was attended by relatively less important functionaries may be explained by the limited agenda of this meeting which was called primarily to set up a permanent editorial board. The attendance of more than the two constitutional representatives at the June meeting may be similarly accounted for by the importance of the occasion. In any case, the list presented above makes it clear that, whenever a major or minor policy decision was to be made, the Cominform has done so through ad hoc meetings of delegates, and not through a permanent policy-making staff. The additional fact that the preparation of the agenda for at least the first and third meetings rested directly with CPSU further speaks against the existence of a staff of policy planners within the Cominform. It is not improbable that such ad hoc meetings of delegates may continue to be adequate in the future, since the leadership of the Cominform Parties is sufficiently "nature" not to require constant sittings for the discussion of the comparatively few major policy problems that may arise.

As to the effective radius of Cominform policy decisions beyond the affiliated Parties, there is no evidence showing that other Parties are legally obliged to conform to them. However, the declaration of the founding conference was implicitly addressed to the entire movement and set--effectively, although not formally--the uncompromising anti-imperialist, anti-US line for every Party on the globe, best illustrated by the abrupt policy shift made by CP India subsequent to the founding conference, and further by the general adherence of Communist Parties to the Cominform program. The June 1948 resolution in its turn was clearly directed at the Cominform Parties only, though it was formally endorsed by many non-Cominform Parties as well. The fact that the Cominform, legally restricted to the affiliated Parties, speaks with sufficient authority to be heard around the world is quite natural. The trained national Communist leadership needs little coaching in reacting properly to decisions made with the approval of CPSU.

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Over and beyond its policy-making function, which may consume little time or personnel, and is merely an extension of the policy-making function of the CPSU (see below), the Cominform is, for the time being, essentially what the official Communist version maintains: a bureau for the collection and dissemination of information. This is not without precedent. The Comintern itself contained in its headquarters apparatus an "Information Department" which provided the policy-makers of the Executive Committee of the Third International with the necessary political intelligence upon which to base decisions, e.g., information concerning the status of the national Parties and political-economic conditions abroad. The Information Department also provided each national Party with reports on the work of the Comintern and on the progress of other Parties. ²² To this end, special "rapporteurs" for groups of countries were attached to the department which maintained liaison with the national Parties through special "informers" appointed by the respective central committees. In such fashion the "exchange of experience" appears to have been implemented by the Comintern. According to Togliatti's authoritative definition the Cominform performs broadly the same functions for the affiliated Parties as the Information Department did for the Comintern, and it may safely be assumed that the "information" it collects falls into two categories: a) Party status and progress; b) political, social and economic conditions in the broadest sense. This is supported thus far only by a few items of evidence. Milovan Djilas, the leading Yugoslav Communist and delegate at the founding conference, reportedly stated that the principal aims of the Cominform were the detailed examination of the political and economic situation of every nation participating in the Cominform; the examination of the American and British economic and political situation; and the examination of the exchange of heavy industrial goods between all countries and Britain and the USA. At least several Parties have apparently been requested to provide information for the bureau in Belgrade: CP Austria (fortnightly political and industrial reports), CP Belgium (information on anti-Communists and

²² The department prepared daily briefs for the ECCI on current events, special reports on the Communist movement in each country, "information letters" to the Parties, and "special projects" on Party statistics, trends in the labor movement, public opinion, etc.

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"warmongers"), CP Syria and Lebanon (political reports), CP Greece
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 (political and military information).

The Information Bureau probably collects its information through normal Party channels. Since each Party maintains its own national information service for the collection of Party statistics and progress reports, economic and political reports, etc., the Cominform staff simply needs to pool and evaluate the data normally assembled by the affiliated Parties. It is, of course, also possible that the Information Bureau has organized or is organizing an "information machine" of its own, possibly relying on the system used by the Information Department of the Comintern, and co-opting area specialists to its offices while certain personnel or subagencies in the field may act as "informers" or "representatives" for the bureau -- no satisfactory indications of such a development have as yet come to light. It must also be stressed, large numbers of reports to the contrary, that no reliable evidence of any sort is available indicating that the Cominform has developed or is developing a professional secret intelligence service of its own.²³

The scope of the Cominform's information gathering activities cannot be adequately assessed at present. It may well include such matters as the investigation of Party organization, efficiency and ideological security, but there are no indications, for example, that the Cominform investigated the CP Yugoslavia or is playing any investigative role in the current and recent purges within the European Parties. Similarly, it is by no means safely established at present whether the Cominform collects information from non-Cominform Parties. A few scattered reports point in this direction, and it is not improbable that non-Cominform Parties furnish desired data as a matter of international discipline. Finally, it is well within the function of an information bureau to "inform" certain Parties (affiliated or not) of the "experience" of others. There

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is little to show that the bureau has done so clandestinely; overtly, of course, the Cominform "informs" its affiliated Parties and the world movement as a whole through its official journal.

2. Editorial Board. The bureau's official journal For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! appears every two weeks in Rumanian, French, Italian, Hungarian, Russian, Polish and English versions. Its function has been officially defined "to elaborate questions of the great and invincible theory of Marxism-Leninism, the concrete application of this theory and its theses by the Communist Parties in conditions of the given country." The journal is under the jurisdiction of an editorial board whose permanent members were appointed at the mid-January meeting in Belgrade.²⁴

In assessing the organizational significance of the Cominform journal, it is well to remember that a newspaper is traditionally an essential part of any Communist organization, whether national or international. From the defunct Comintern down to insignificant Communist front organizations of the present day, the publication of an "official organ" has been a matter of propagandistic routine.

The Comintern considered its press policy a fundamental responsibility --a problem of co-ordination (or regimentation), of centralized control and detailed guidance. More than half of all the "directives" issued by Comintern headquarters to the national Parties contained references to propaganda and press matters, not only in their technical aspects, such as publication and circulation, but also with regard to general policy content and the detailed treatment of every question of the day. The Comintern also had an "editorial board" in charge of the publication of the official Comintern organ, The Communist International.

The Cominform journal appears to have two aims: to deal with basic Party problems such as organization and correct ideology, thus serving as an authoritative guide for Party leaders, and to maintain a Party news service through incidental coverage of general political problems--labor

24. The permanent members of the editorial board are: Z. Biro (probably Karoly), Hungary; D. Voda-Peksa, Czechoslovakia; Vagan Grigoryan, Pavel Yudin, N. Shumilov, USSR; N. Halachev, Bulgaria; M. Gersich and Doris Zihorl, Yugoslavia; D. Pajetta (probably Giancarlo), Italy; Pierre Hontges, France; J. Finkelstein, Poland; and A. Buikan, Rumania.

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policy, Palestine, Marshall Plan, etc. It is perhaps useful to point out that the Cominform journal is essentially not a propaganda sheet in the Western sense--a paper designed to affect the attitudes of non-Communists--but a propaganda instrument in the Communist sense--an instrument of Party indoctrination. The fact that, to a Western observer, its performance has not reached the level of the Soviet and some of the non-Russian Communist publications, does not detract from its usefulness as a readily accessible ideological guide and news exchange. As such, it is of obvious interest to non-Cominform Parties also, although up to now the non-affiliated Parties can have received little direct guidance from the journal which has focussed its interest primarily on the affiliated Parties. Among the European Parties, only CP Great Britain and to a lesser extent CP Sweden, CP Belgium, and CP Greece have figured appreciably in the journal's coverage. Significant material directly affecting non-European Parties (e.g., CP India, Japan, Mexico) is rare. Although no definitive conclusions can be drawn from such public trends, it is clearly indicated that the current primary jurisdiction of the Cominform is actually restricted to its officially announced membership.

B. Jurisdiction

The organizational radius of the Cominform was outlined by Jacques Duclos when he announced on 27 October 1947 that "the Communist Parties which were not represented at the (founding) conference...have, of course, the possibility of making any intervention that they judge necessary to the Bureau of Information both concerning co-ordination of an action on the basis of full agreement, and in connection with a request for admission to the Bureau of Information." Although it appears that the Cominform is theoretically open to all Parties on the basis of voluntary submission, in practice there is little reliable evidence of actual additional affiliations. CP Belgium may very possibly have privately joined. CP Netherlands, Greece and Free Territory of Trieste have been reported as affiliated members, but supporting evidence is scarce. Other Parties have discussed affiliation and decided against it. The leadership of CP Japan, for example, reportedly split over the issue of affiliation, and CP Sweden, Norway and Denmark, enjoined to affiliate at a meeting of Party leaders in Oslo (February 1948), refused apparently for reasons of

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national policy. In Latin America no affiliations took place, although a number of leading Party functionaries from most of the Latin-American Parties were reported as officially accepting the policies announced by the Cominform. CP Lebanon and Syria are reportedly in close contact with the Cominform, yet the evidence is still too contradictory to permit definite conclusions. CP Great Britain conformed to the policy laid down at the founding conference, but no evidence of its affiliation has been uncovered.

Whatever the potential relations of the Cominform with non-affiliated Parties, there is no reliably proved basis upon which to judge them at present. On the whole, the situation referred to by Duclos may prevail, and non-affiliated Parties may simply submit their problems to the Cominform for a decision. Undoubtedly, non-Cominform Parties may also seek informal liaison with the Information Bureau for self-informative purposes.

The jurisdictional problem is further complicated by reports claiming that "other Cominform" exist, performing the functions of the European Information Bureau in Latin America and the Far East. Before examining these possibilities, however, a few words are called for on the most significant aspect of the "European" Cominform--the controls exercised by CPSU.

C. CPSU Control

Whatever the intended or actual scope and authority of the Cominform, the new organization is effectively controlled by CPSU although it is on paper a regional party "federation" with equal rights for its members. At the founding conference, the CPSU representative, A.A. Zhdanov, laid down the Cominform's general policy, action program and organizational form, and the other delegates merely subscribed. The same procedure prevailed at the June meeting (1948) which dealt with the problem of CP Yugoslavia. Prior to this meeting, CPSU, by way of direct written communications during the period of March-May 1948, made certain criticisms and demands of CP Yugoslavia, notifying the other Cominform Parties of this correspondence by sending them copies of its letters. CPSU also forwarded the criticisms of certain other Cominform Parties to CP Yugoslavia. Only after this procedure and verbal contacts with leaders of CP Yugoslavia had proved unsuccessful, was the Cominform meeting in Rumania called to endorse the accusation of the CPSU against CP Yugoslavia.

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These facts clearly indicate, if any indication is needed, that the Cominform serves merely as a rubber stamp for policy decisions made originally by CPSU. CPSU control extends further over the editorial board and the journal of the Cominform. One of the members of the board, Vagan Grigoryan, is deputy chief of the Agitprop Department of CPSU, and Pavel Yudin, chief editor of the journal, is an acknowledged Soviet theoretician and early proponent of an uncompromising anti-imperialist, anti-US line. The consistently anti-US line of the journal and the constantly raised demands for ideological solidification of the movement hark back to Zhdanov's speech at the founding meeting. Grigoryan is a subordinate of Suslov, Chief of the Agitprop Department/CPSU. Suslov himself was appointed in the course of a Zhdanov-inspired purge of the department, and was present at the June meeting of the Cominform (re Tito) together with Zhdanov and Malenkov. There is little doubt that the editorial board and the journal are virtually extensions of the Agitprop Department/CPSU. It remains to be seen to what extent recent changes in that department will affect the editorial policy of the Cominform.

In addition to the undeniable fact of the overriding influence of CPSU within the Cominform which in realistic terms must be regarded as a mere appendage to CC/CPSU, the CPSU does not hesitate to bypass the Cominform and deal directly with Cominform Parties, notably CP Italy, CP France, and recently CP Yugoslavia. Whether this means that the CPSU regards the Cominform merely as a publicity agent for its own decisions (as illustrated by the Tito incident), or whether there is a fine, functional dividing line between direct CPSU and Cominform responsibilities which elude the Western observer, is difficult to say. With the exception of the policy decisions made at the founding conference and at the June meeting which were clearly preestablished by CPSU, no evidence exists that the Cominform actually formulated the policy for, or co-ordinated any major Communist operations in, Europe after September 1947.

D. Other Cominform

To conclude this analysis, it is necessary to inquire whether or not the CPSU has organized "Information Bureaus" for other than the European "region." Although such a procedure would be in line with Comintern practices, it must be noted, first, that Duclos' statement

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of the expansibility of the "European" Cominform has never been officially refuted and, second, that the evidence produced to support the existence of other Cominform is virtually worthless. The story of "other Cominform" is still purely in the rumor stage.

1. Latin America. Reports on the impending establishment of "two headquarters of a new Cominform for Latin America" in Havana, Cuba, and Montevideo, Uruguay, were received in October 1947 from a source

[REDACTED] who stated that the organization was supposed to be established by a delegation of the World Federation of Democratic Youth traveling through Latin America in February and March 1948.

Subsequent events have failed to corroborate this information and it is believed that the reports were entirely notional, based on a somewhat superficial knowledge of Communist affairs and the activities of the World Federation of Democratic Youth. No confirmation from other [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] sources has been obtained; on the contrary, [REDACTED] Argentine Communist circles, having recently stated that "there is no Cominform in Latin America in the regular and formal sense," mentioned several Latin American leaders who like others, had accepted Cominform policies, steering their Parties along Cominform lines and maintaining informal liaison with each other through the offices of the Uruguayan Communists, Rodney Aristonendi, Eugenio Gomez, and Enrique Rodriguez. The existence of such a pro-Cominform faction within the national Parties in Latin America appears at present more likely than any formalized organization.

2. Far East. No satisfactory evidence exists at present indicating that a "Far Eastern Cominform" operates clandestinely at Vladivostok with covert branch offices in Harbin, Japan, North and South Korea, for the purpose of co-ordinating the policies of CP China, Korea and Japan. Neither the various reports [REDACTED] nor the many, allegedly genuine Party documents and minutes of Party meetings procured in Japan and referring to the existence of a Far Eastern Cominform, can be accepted as adequate evidence. These reports agree on one basic point--that a Far Eastern Cominform with headquarters in

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25. Codovilla and Ghioldi (Argentina); Prestes (Brazil); Pena and Grobart (Cuba); Encina (Mexico); and others from Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.

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Vladivostok was established at a meeting of Far Eastern and Soviet Communists in Harbin in November 1947--but it is well to remember that the story of a planned meeting in Harbin first appeared in the Chinese Kuomintang press and radio immediately after the creation of the Belgrade Cominform in October 1947. This rumor gradually worked its way around the globe, with the addition of considerable embroideries by professional informants.

To review the "evidence" briefly, early Kuomintang reports maintained that a "Far Eastern Cominform" was established at a meeting in Harbin or Poli in November 1947, and that the representatives present from China, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, Indo-China, Indonesia and India decided to set up the headquarters of the "Far East Cominform" in Vladivostok. More recently a [REDACTED] source claimed that this meeting was actually held in Khabarovsk (15-19 December 1947) and was attended by representatives from China, Korea, Japan, Mongolia, French Indo-China, India, Burma and Malaya, by representatives of bodies called "Far Eastern Branch of the United Communist Nations" and "Central Committee of the United Communist Nations," and by L.M. Malenkov and N.A. Vossnessensky. According to this report, it was decided to set up an "Asiatic International Liaison Bureau" in Vladivostok as well as an "Investigation Commission in New York under the sponsorship of the Central Political Bureau of the United Communist Nations" (sic) to investigate Nanking-Washington collaboration. Even if some of this absurd nonenclature is overlooked, the absence of supporting evidence leaves considerable room for doubt.

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This doubt cannot be dispelled by allegedly genuine minutes of secret Party sessions in Japan at which a November meeting in Harbin (confusingly other, similar documents mention Vladivostok as the place of this meeting) was discussed. According to these documents, the Harbin conference was initiated by an Indo-Chinese Communist present in China at the time of the official announcement concerning the creation of the Belgrade Cominform. In view of the fact that the original Cominform was clearly created by CPSU as an additional control instrument, it appears highly unlikely that the initiative for the organization of a Far Eastern Cominform should have been in the hands of a minor non-Russian Communist.

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In addition, there are several references in the quoted minutes which mar their authenticity decisively, viz., several non-existing Communist Parties are mentioned as having been represented at the Harbin conference, e.g., a Ural Republic Party, a Burma Socialist Labor Party (long out of business), an Afghanistan Communist Party (no such organization is known to exist), and an Enkai-shu Communist Party (sic). Various coded Party documents "intercepted" in Japan refer to directives received from the Far East Cominform by a "Far Eastern Cominform Preparatory Committee" within the national organization of CP Japan. These documents have come from one part of Japan only (Hokkaido region) and have been frequently stamped with the Showa era chronology whereas other CP Japan documents are almost always dated according to the Christian era. Further, the fact that the key to the code employed in these documents was conveniently available makes it highly likely that an efficient paper mill, possibly the Anti-Communist League, is responsible for the whole episode.

In spite of the substantial intelligence build-up over the past six months, the existence of a Far Eastern Cominform cannot be at present accepted.

3. Southeast Asia. Reports that a Cominform for Southeast Asia is in the process of being established at Bangkok are similarly unconfirmed, and in all likelihood may simply be a standard reflex from the recent establishment of a Soviet Legation at Bangkok.

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In assessing the extent and type of direct control over foreign Parties exercised since the war by the CPSU, one general fact is well-established: the days of the Comintern approach with their inherent bureaucracy and extensive organizational apparatus are over. In the postwar period a dynamic functional approach has succeeded the prewar system of static control machinery, with direction from the center exercised much more exclusively on the strategic level and responding more immediately to the demand of current action priorities. There is, therefore, no neat pattern of national or regional control machinery duplicated around the globe, nor a mechanical push-button system of direction within the CC/CPSU to which all foreign Parties respond with equal docility. The problem of analyzing the current "system" of CPSU central control is accordingly more complex and more subtle than in the days of the Comintern.

Though not the subject of this section, the ideological control exercised by the CC/CPSU over the world movement must be reviewed, however briefly, for the light it throws on the organizational control requirements at this stage of the Communist movement. The former involves the automatic adherence and loyalty of the international movement to the ideological program and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The reality of this attitude as a political factor is not to be underestimated although a Western observer will normally fail to fathom the psychological depths in which such loyalty is firmly anchored. Obviously resulting from constant indoctrination and to a certain extent also from the historically justified realization that without the Soviet Union the Communist movement abroad could not long survive in its present form, the ideological loyalty of the movement provides the spiritual sine qua non of Soviet control. Without it no durable organizational controls could be exercised. Without it there would be no integrated world movement. With it the organizational controls required to keep it integrated can be kept to an efficient minimum, especially at this relatively "mature" stage of the World Party's development.

In this sense, the Central Committee of the CPSU constitutes the effective ideological center of the international Communist movement

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in the postwar as in the prewar period, the existence of "moderate," "nationalist," and "anti-Moscow" factions in various Parties notwithstanding. The dissolution of the Comintern has affected very little the ideological solidarity of the World Party which it had created, nor has it in any way affected the controlling role played by the Soviet Union in the systematic exploitation of the movement in the interest of Soviet foreign policy--a principle formally announced in 1928, but operative from the very beginning.

All aspects of international Communist activity, ranging from the basic Party program and national propaganda lines to the penetration techniques employed by each Party within its national government and social structure, fall into an efficient and thoroughly integrated pattern effectively determined, previously or contemporaneously, by the CC/CPSU. Although during the postwar period, with the Communists' ambivalent commitment to the principle of nationalism, this direction has not always been either realistic or intelligent, and Soviet objectives have frequently run counter to Party interests and the interests of one Party counter to those of another, the world-wide organizational framework of the Communist movement today responds to the same center which has thus far guided it through a variegated but eminently successful career.

It is quite clear that both the strategic and tactical political-propagandistic direction of the Communist Parties by the Soviet Party-Government is effectively implemented today by countless overt and official activities of the latter. Speeches from the UN rostrum, discussions around the conference tables of the Council of Foreign Ministers, news releases following Komendatura meetings, diplomatic notes, the editorial columns of Pravda and Izvestiya, Moscow radio programs, TASS handouts, feature articles in the New Times, Party Life, Culture and Life, Bolshevik, World Economics and World Politics, the Gazette of the Academy of Science of the USSR--all present, to the Communist and non-Communist world alike, the official "line" of the Soviet Party-

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Government on matters ranging from the Marxist estimate of capitalist
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 crisis to the adherence of Finland to the World Bank.

It can safely be accepted that the overt ideological direction of the world movement, now led in most cases on the national level by men in whom the Comintern and its schools have invested twenty-five years of theoretical and practical training, constitutes at present the main lever for Soviet-inspired political action abroad. There is now no significant Communist Party on the face of the globe whose national leadership does not include one or several members previously active in the Comintern headquarters organization or field service, and/or trained at the Lenin School or other training centers in the USSR. In addition, a great number of leading non-Soviet Communists has acquired considerable practical revolutionary experience in uprisings at home, in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War, or, as in Europe during World War II, in underground resistance and partisan movements, not to mention the Chinese Party leadership with its successful military record. The organizational and revolutionary expertise of the Communist world leadership has been further enhanced by frequent direct participation in the illegal undercover operations of their Parties, both in sabotage and espionage and in underground work under Fascist regimes, on behalf of the Party and of the Soviet intelligence services. In terms of practical, human experience the national Communist leaders are predominantly seasoned, well-disciplined lieutenants in political-revolutionary action, and it would be unrealistic to conceive of them as requiring day-to-day supervision in the form of "secret" instructions and directives. Obviously, not all the leaders are of equal stature or of equal subservience to the CPSU, but their capabilities for independent execution of programs and tasks called for by the overtly announced line of the

26. The utility of this system is well illustrated by the statements of the Swiss Communist, Karl Hoffmaier, who during a confidential interview in 1946 when he was secretary general and effective head of CP Switzerland (Partei der Arbeit), denied the necessity of any secret connection with Moscow, pointing out that he had spent eleven years in the Soviet Union and spoke Russian fluently; that as a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern for five years, he had learned to know Togliatti, Duclos, Marty, Dimitrov, and Browder, not to speak of Stalin, Vishinsky, Manuilski, and Trotsky; and that their common faith and common training had shaped the mentality of all these men so that the broader outlines of Soviet-Communist policy, as it changed to meet new situations, were more matters of course to all of them. Hoffmaier also regularly read Pravda.

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CPSU should not be underestimated. A high degree of co-ordination and single purpose in the world movement would be achieved even if the CC/CPSU were to confine its direction to such public media.

The basic problem of direct Soviet control of foreign Communist Parties obviously does not lie here. The broad outlines of the Soviet program and requirements have been fully and publicly presented to a world leadership which is generally capable of translating them into national terms. The major problem lies much more in the degree to which the CPSU employs direct organizational controls to support its political-propagandistic executive role, and in the specific techniques used by CPSU in exercising these controls.

27. The most detailed public exposition of general requirements for Party work abroad was made recently (17 September 1948) over the Moscow radio in a talk reviewing the first year of the Cominform. Addressing all foreign Communist Parties, the broadcast stated:

"The successes achieved by Communist Parties throughout the world have been great. However, a number of Communist Parties have not solved such important problems as gaining the support of the majority of the working class. In 1925 (sic) Comrade Stalin stated that the Communist Parties in order to become effective, must fulfill these conditions:

It is particularly important to improve in every way possible the quality of the membership of the Communist Party.

Communist Parties must regard themselves as the highest form of the class organization of the proletariat which is called upon to assume the leadership of all other forms of proletarian organizations.

It is essential that the leading cadres master the theory of Marxism.

It is essential that the Communist Parties work out new directives as a result of the thorough analysis of the concrete conditions of the revolutionary movement in their respective countries and the study of experiences in other countries.

And finally it is necessary that the Parties engage in criticism and self-criticism, and thus prevent the transmitting of errors to the cadres.

If the Communist Parties in other lands will energetically fulfill these directives of Stalin and if they continue to learn the experiences of our Bolshevik Party, we may be confident that not only will they achieve great successes, but also they will score that great historical victory which was scored by our Bolshevik Party, headed by Lenin and Stalin."

And further,

"Relations with the Soviet Union form the cornerstone for all Socialists."

The practical implications of this speech must be clear to every Communist leader, viz., intensification of organizational work and theoretical training, purges of unreliable elements, re-examination of Party tactics with an eye toward more realistic pre-revolutionary action, deepening of relations with other Parties for the purpose of policy integration.

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Organizational control under the Comintern covered a broad range of activities: specific tactical instructions and directives; disciplinary action against recalcitrant Party leaders and factions, including replacement and liquidation of functionaries; financial subsidies, including accountability of the recipients; training of foreign Party functionaries; supervision and development of Party organizations and auxiliaries, both legal and illegal; supervision of, and assistance for, revolutionary action (strikes, uprisings, etc.); provision of transportation, safehaven and subsidization for exiled or endangered Party leaders; supervision, and assistance for, underground Parties and incipient Party nuclei, especially in colonial areas, etc.. Prior to the outbreak of war, the Comintern with its technical and communication services was geared to the permanent implementation of such organizational controls. With the effective dissolution of the Comintern, the intermediate executive echelon between the CC/CPSU and the national Parties was eliminated. The inevitable corollary to this junking of the formal center of the international movement was the direct participation by the Soviet Party-Government in such executive and advisory relations with the international movement as it deemed necessary. In the course of the war the Soviet Party-Government more and more took a direct hand in what had formerly been Comintern-managed affairs. The direct provision of financial and organizational support to foreign Party leaders in Moscow during the war years; the creation of new international front organizations (Pan Slav Committee, Anti-Fascist Committees, etc.); the direct support of Communist elements in national resistance movements; the physical movement of Communist functionaries from one area to the other (from the wartime parachuting of Moscatelli into Italy to the postwar transportation of Ludwig Renn, Paul Merker, et al., from Mexico City, and of Harry Berger @ Ewert from Brazil to the Soviet Zone of Germany via the USSR)--these and similar activities had been normal prewar jobs for the Comintern.

An appraisal of the extent of organizational controls exercised by CPSU in the postwar period cannot proceed in vacuo and must be first related to the current position of Soviet political theory which evolved

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after Stalingrad into the basic concept of the two opposing camps-- the anti-imperialist, "democratic" forces led by the Soviet Union versus the imperialist forces led by the US, the latter having replaced Hitler Germany as the arch-enemy of the Communist "new order." Applied to the relations of foreign Parties to the CPSU this theory has a concrete meaning, viz., the main function of every Communist Party now is even more to protect the USSR since an armed intervention against the Soviet Union in the not too distant future is highly probable. Such expectations on the part of the Soviet leaders would appear in principle to call for increased organizational controls because not only general questions of political strategy are involved but also specific practical and organizational problems. Obviously it is for the CPSU to determine what action on the part of a national Party constitutes the best defense for the Soviet Union. Obviously not every such decision can be entrusted to overt-propagandistic transmission. And yet, while all Communist Parties abroad have been emphatically exhorted to gear their national strategy and tactics to the defense of the Soviet Union, there has been so far little evidence showing that the exhortation was accompanied by a general and formalized implementation of organizational controls. Several considerations are pertinent here.

The current Soviet position regarding the imminence of a war against the USSR is nothing new. From 1928 to 1934, the Comintern operated under the assumption that war was imminent and stipulated "that attention should be concentrated on the defense of the USSR," at the same time demanding the acceleration of the revolutionary tempo abroad and an intransigent, non-cooperative attitude towards the "traitorous" moderate elements of the left. From 1935 until 1939, this strategy was changed into the united front policy of collaboration with the non-Communist left. During these periods the basic techniques

28. Most recently, N.A. Voznesenski, Politburo/CPSU, has announced: "Lenin's great companion in arms and successor, Stalin, teaches that the duty of every revolutionary is to protect and defend the USSR which represents the first Socialist state in the world. Only he who unconditionally protects the USSR is an internationalist, for it is impossible to solve the problems of the international revolutionary workers' movement without protecting the Soviet Union."

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for the "defense of the USSR" were developed by the Comintern and its affiliated Parties, from the creation of national "illegal apparatus" (the undercover intelligence, counterintelligence and military Party organizations) to the establishment of national and international front organizations designed to capture sympathizing elements and spread additional anti-war and anti-Fascist propaganda. In view of the considerable experience gained by the Parties of the world from 1928 to 1939 in the techniques of "Soviet defense" it may be estimated that the currently renewed demand of CPSU for "protection" does not tax the ingenuity of national leaders with problems which they cannot solve largely by themselves in terms of agitation and propaganda as well as in clandestine action terms (penetration of government and military establishments, industrial and maritime sabotage, intelligence operations and feasible revolutionary action).

The organizational control requirements of the international movement abroad vary also with the stage of development attained by a Communist Party, and with the position which it occupies in the "class struggle" of its country. An analysis of current Party strength reveals that a considerable number of the Parties outside of the Soviet satellite and occupation belt are successfully established but have not reached the stature of mass parties capable of realizing the dictatorship of the proletariat in the immediate future, except in case of severe economic crisis. According to Leninist-Stalinist theory and practice, their major objective must therefore remain in the further development of their political and revolutionary action potential until it is strong enough to organize a successful revolution. This situation, which involves persistent emphasis on organizational and conspiratorial problems--the application of time-worn principles and techniques, reducing the necessity for CPSU controls to a minimum--applies in our opinion to the following Parties, some of which are currently outlawed:

Europe: Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland.

Western Hemisphere: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela.

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Far East: Australia, India, Philippines, New Zealand, Indonesia.

Middle East: Lebanon, Syria, Palestine.

In addition, there are several "colonial" Parties which may be bypassed by CPSU and yet be thoroughly integrated with the international Communist program by virtue of their dependence upon the Party of the imperialist mother country, or upon a strong neighboring Party. According to available evidence such is the case with most of the Parties within the French colonial empire; viz., Algeria, French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, French West Indies. Similarly, Party organizations in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Alaska and the Canal Zone are mainly dependent on CPUSA. The effectiveness of CP Great Britain in permanently guiding and assisting colonial Parties cannot be adequately gauged, but within the British colonial empire CP India provides a co-ordination point for the Parties in Burma, Ceylon, and probably Malaya and Pakistan. In the Middle East, CP Lebanon and Syria are in a position to integrate the work of Party organization in the area of Transjordan, Iraq and possibly Egypt.

In practical terms it must also be considered that a number of Parties are in such poor organizational shape and/or operate under such severe conditions of suppression that the employment of organizational controls either represents a wasted effort or is scarcely feasible. To the former category belong the comparatively insignificant Party organizations in Eritrea, Luxembourg, Haiti and Panama; to the latter, the Parties or nuclei in Spain proper, Portugal, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, Paraguay, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.

Viewed against this perspective, the actual control problem of Parties outside the Soviet satellite and occupation belt is considerably narrowed down, and the degree to which CPSU may exert a largely informal control over these Parties is determined by their state of development, the "maturity" of their leaders, and the demands of shifting international political requirements. Clearly, this estimate can serve at the moment only as a rule of thumb--every Communist Party, whether mature or immature, legal or illegal, may be called upon by the

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CPSU to perform, within the context of the international situation, a specific service in the interest of USSR foreign policy--strikes, uprisings, sabotage, peace, propaganda campaigns, etc. Again, however, it is fairly evident that these "services" can be performed largely upon the initiative of the national leadership on the basis of the more general guidance received overtly from the CPSU. The Soviet anti-Marshall Plan policy, for example, calls for political strikes in order to weaken the economy of ERP countries--but once this policy is accepted, its implementation and even its timing may often be left to an experienced national leadership, which, to further the efficiency of their strike program, will naturally co-ordinate with neighboring fraternal Parties.

Over and above the varying needs within the international movement for direct CPSU control, the part played by the CPSU in directing foreign Parties today is primarily affected by the extent of the Soviet Government control over non-Soviet territories. The procedural aspects of organizational Party control vary considerably with the political and geographical relationship existing between the Soviet Government and the foreign governments or Party-Governments involved. It has accordingly been found convenient to discuss the actual evidence on direct CPSU control separately for: (A) the satellites; (B) areas occupied by the USSR; (C) countries directly adjacent to the USSR or to its satellites; and (D) the remaining countries of the world.

A. The Satellites

There is little need for comment on the extent or the procedural aspects of control exerted by the CPSU over the Parties of the satellite governments of Eastern Europe, all of which, with the exception of CP Yugoslavia, were placed in power by the Soviet Government and kept in power with the aid of the Soviet Army, the MVD and the MGB. The Soviet-sponsored creation of the Polish Lublin Government; the transportation of East European Communists from the USSR to their national capitals; Vishinsky's intervention with King Mihail of Rumania on behalf of Groza; Zorin's intervention with Benes at the time of the Czechoslovakian coup; the intimidation of the Polish and Hungarian

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opposition; the general pressurizing of Social Democrats into fusion with the Communists; the assignment of Soviet advisers to national security, intelligence and military establishments; the independent operations of Soviet security agencies in Eastern Europe, especially their supervision of Party leaders; the network of cultural, military, trade and friendship pacts; the enforced withdrawal of satellite countries from the Marshall Plan--all these facts illustrate the process of colonization in progress, and it is clear that the total Soviet Party-Government machine is involved. The dual Party-Government command of the USSR is now duplicated in the satellite areas, and every intergovernmental contact among these countries is at the same time an inter-Party contact. In addition to the extensive amount of "normal" intercourse that has gone on between Soviet and satellite leaders in the past several years, there have also been countless trips to Moscow (or to Sochi) by satellite Party leaders, and innumerable international meetings of trade unions and of cultural, scientific and other organizations.

Within this complex panorama of meetings, visits, conferences, trade discussions, etc., the main lines of specifically Party control by the CPSU have become somewhat clearer now that the conflict between CPSU and CP Yugoslavia has been brought out into the open. The CC/CPSU, very likely under the personal direction of Zhdanov--prior to his death--and Malenkov, takes a direct bureaucratic hand in satellite Party control. The fact that the CC/CPSU sent letters of criticism, political analyses, and instructions to the CC/CP Yugoslavia during the period from March to May 1948 clearly indicates that the CPSU has assumed, at least for the satellite areas, direct ECCI-type Party steering functions on strategic questions. In no case, however, is it possible to differentiate technically between the controls exercised by the Soviet Government and those handled on a strictly Party level. The balancing act currently being carried on in the USSR-Yugoslavia dispute, with its theoretical confinement to the Party level, clearly exhibits the impossibility of making such distinctions within the Soviet-satellite system of dual national power. Similarly, direct controls

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exercised by CPSU can be distinguished from those exercised through the Cominform only in a formalistic and rather meaningless sense.

B. Soviet-Occupied Countries

As in the case of the satellite countries, control of the Parties in areas occupied by the Soviet Army (Germany, Austria, North Korea) is a comparatively simple matter and may be conveniently channeled through the Soviet administrative bureaucracy, more particularly through specific Soviet officials in charge of liaison with the local Party or Party units.

The German Party in the Soviet Zone has been directly controlled by the CPSU ever since its exiled Central Committee was transported from Moscow to Berlin by the Red Army in 1945 along with some members of the National Committee of Free Germany and personnel trained in the Antifa camps in the USSR. The Soviet Military Administration in Karlshorst is responsible for the systematic assignment of Party personnel within the Central Administration and for packing the police with Communists or "pro-Soviet" personnel; for setting up the major Communist front organizations, such as the FDGB (Free German Association of Trade Unions), KDED (Cultural League for the Democratic Rejuvenation of Germany), and the FDJ (Free German Youth); for the systematic intimidation, incarceration and liquidation of the anti-Communist opposition by the UVD (Directorate of Internal Affairs in the Soviet Zone) and the MGB; for the "fusion" of the Communists with the Social Democrats into the SED (Socialist Unity Party); and for the general propaganda and political line of the German Party. Direct contact of German Party functionaries with Soviet officials in Karlshorst ensures full co-ordination, which is obviously enforceable by direct Soviet military and police power, and clearly facilitated by the fact that a great percentage of the German Communist leadership is Comintern-trained and has spent years of exile in the Soviet Union.

Similarly, the small Austrian Party—whose capabilities are clearly not overestimated by the Soviets—with its exiled leadership restored by the Red Army, has been used as an additional instrument of pressure

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against the Austrian Government. As in Germany, Party controls are maintained through direct contact, and extend from the provision of rations to Party functionaries to the supervision of a para-military organization (the factory police) in the Soviet Zone.

The control of the Party in the occupied areas naturally extends to Party elements in the Western-occupied areas of the country. In Germany and North Korea especially, "direct" CPSU controls extend across the demarcation line by virtue of the close contacts maintained between the superficially split Parties. In Germany and Korea there are regularly operating clandestine courier routes which can be employed to supplement and particularize the more overt co-ordination of organizational and propagandistic Party activity achieved through press and radio. Significant of the importance of these routes is the fact that in Germany their central operational direction is in the hands of a former Comintern functionary sitting in the Central Secretariat of the SED.

C. Countries Adjacent to the Soviet Union or its Satellites

The degree of control exercised by the CPSU over the Chinese and Greek Parties has been subject to an extensive amount of discussion and speculation. It is a simple fact that, in organizational terms, the CPSU is in a position, by reason of geographical proximity, to develop and maintain secretly such direct contacts and relationships with these two Parties as it pleases.

In the case of the Chinese Party, part of the national leadership has had extensive training in the Soviet Union, and a strongly pro-Soviet faction exists in CP China beside the more "neutral" elements firmly entrenched in the national hierarchy. It is a reasonably sound assumption, borne out by Mao-tse's and Li-Li San's trips to Moscow, that such contacts as are considered desirable or necessary are maintained by the CPSU with individuals among the national Party leadership. Further, although the precise extent to which the Soviet Party-Government has provided the Chinese Party-Government with military and other aid is not known, it is a reasonable assumption that normal contacts have been and are being maintained between Soviet and Chinese Party administrative or other officials. It is unlikely that additional

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evidence can be procured to delineate exactly the nature of these relations. Since there is no doubt whatever that the CPSU can handle them precisely as it wishes to, the problem of the actual organizational media employed is as academic as in the case of the Eastern European satellites.

In the case of CP Greece it has generally been assumed that the immediate direction and support of both the Party and the Markos Government has rested with the neighboring Party-Governments of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, and that only decisions of major importance are raised with CPSU personnel either in Moscow (as in the case of Zachariades' recent trip) or at one of the Balkan capitals. There is complete and rather definitive absence of any evidence whatever that "special Soviet representatives" are assigned either to the migratory Party leadership or to the seat of the Markos Government and that the limited Soviet official representation in Athens has ever played any role in the direct control of the local Party. The extent to which general discussion of Greek Party affairs comes up on the agenda of such Cominform meetings as take place is an open question, but since the behavior of the Greek Party has strategic implications for the program which CPSU has given to the Cominform, it would be unlikely for this organization rigorously to withhold advice or direction from its struggling comrades. Although the Greek Party has never formally joined the Cominform, there can be little question that it had, until Tito's expulsion from the Cominform, informally operated under a pattern of indirect control strongly reminiscent of the prewar "Balkan Federation" which, itself under Comintern control, had been responsible for the direction of the Greek Party.

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that CPSU is in a position to exercise at will direct and relatively secure organizational contacts with Communist or crypto-Communist groups existing in immediately contiguous countries, such as the Azerbaidzhan "democrats" or the pro-Soviet elements in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia.

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~~SECRET~~D. Countries outside the Soviet Orbit

In dealing with the problem of Soviet direction of Parties in countries where the Soviet Union does not occupy a special position, the communications and the techniques employed by the CPSU to effect desired controls over the world movement present a much more subtle and complex problem. In the first place, it is clear that these controls are currently not so extensive as they were under the Comintern in the twenties or thirties. On the other hand, even minimal control requirements, implemented sporadically upon a priority basis, call for organization, however informal, both on a headquarters level and in the field.

On the basis of the very limited evidence presented below, it may tentatively be stated that the CC/CPSU, and within it very probably G.A. Malenkov, maintain a headquarters staff for the handling of problems connected with the control of foreign Parties. There is some slight indication that a "political" or "foreign" department within the CC/CPSU formerly directed the executive organs of the Comintern, and it is not at all improbable that one or several sections or subsections of the CC/CPSU today are bureaucratically concerned with the political steering and organizational control of foreign Parties, and that foreign Communists, directly responsible to CPSU, serve in an advisory capacity or as representatives of their Parties either at the seat of CC/CPSU or in their own countries. The letters sent by CC/CPSU to CC/CP Yugoslavia and to the other Cominform Parties during March/May 1948, containing detailed criticism of CP Yugoslavia, presuppose the existence of a directing staff within CC/CPSU assisted by specialists devoted, at least on the political analyst level, to the study of Yugoslav Party affairs. Similarly, it may be tentatively assumed that specific staff personnel of CC/CPSU are occupied with Italian problems, for apparently reliable reports indicate that the running direction of CP Italy (political steering and financial assistance) is currently carried on by the CPSU. Further, CP Finland reportedly receives daily instructions from CPSU, and Rikard Aage Jensen, former Comintern agent, appears to have some hand in transmitting instructions from some organ of the CPSU to CP Denmark. The

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fact that the Parties of the Middle East have been controlled consistently for the past two years by the Soviet Legation in Beirut (see below) again points toward a directing staff in the central Party organization in Moscow since it is highly improbable that Party controls are left entirely to the discretion of any one local representative. The circumstances surrounding the expulsion of Earl Browder from the CPUSA in 1945 form another link in the circumstantial evidence which strengthens the assumption that the same element in the CC/CPSU is committed to the staff work involved in the direction of foreign Parties. It has been established with a reasonable degree of certainty that Browder received instructions through clandestine international channels to revise the policy of CPUSA well in advance of the overt attack made upon him by Jacques Duclos in Cahiers du Communisme in April 1945--there are good reasons to believe that these instructions originated with the CC/CPSU.

No matter who within the CC and/or the Politburo of CPSU is in direct charge of foreign Party control, it is obvious that a certain amount of political and organizational research and analysis must be carried out to assist the men who make policy decisions. This staff work, it is suggested, is probably performed by personnel of the CC/CPSU; however, it is likely that both the geographical desks within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR furnish additional reports on the status of foreign Parties and studies of the theoretical foundations of current political strategy.

Clearly, in formulating the foreign policy of the USSR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must take into account the development and action potential of foreign Communist as well as other Parties, and it may be taken for granted that its field representatives collect information on the local Parties relevant to their political reportage assignments for analysis by the Ministry desks in Moscow and obviously also for use by the CC/CPSU.

29. The recent exchange of letters between CPSU and CP Yugoslavia offers ample evidence of this practice. CP Yugoslavia complained that the Soviet Ambassador and his staff in collecting such information directly contacted Party members and lower Party organizations instead of going through proper channels. The Soviet answer stressed that "Soviet workers" are primarily Communists and not bureaucrats and that their concern with foreign Party matters is thoroughly justified on this basis.

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The "academicians" within the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, particularly those within the branches of history and philosophy, economics and law, are experts on "scientific socialism." They furnish the Central Committee with the results of their research on foreign Parties which is clearly performed on a higher theoretical level than that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Articles written by them for Soviet publications may well be interpreted as the official Party line on the problems of foreign Parties. The director of the Pacific Ocean Institute, for instance, has published several articles delineating fundamentally the current line of CP India. Pavel F. Yudin, currently representative of CPSU in the Cominform and chief editor of the latter's journal, is listed as deputy academician and secretary of the branch of history and philosophy (1945). The position and activities of the economist E.S. Varga, secretary of the branch of economics and law and director of the--now dissolved--Institute of World Economy and World Politics, are of course well known. The close connection of the Academy with the CPSU is further illustrated by the fact that N.A. Voznesenski, member of the Politburo, is also a member of the Academy of Sciences. His book on the Soviet war economy, recently published in English, further proves that the "scientific socialists" are concerned, at least in terms of Party theory, with the policy of foreign Parties.

Considering further that the Cominform is authorized to collect progress reports from the affiliated Parties, it is clear that those individuals within the CC/CPSU who represent the supreme authority are sufficiently informed to make policy decisions related to the control of foreign Parties (see the rejection of Varga's economic theses by the CPSU).

With the bulk of the overt political steering entrusted to public media, the CPSU does not now need an organized communication system comparable to the clandestine service of the International Liaison Department (OMS) or the Permanent Bureaus of the Comintern. As pointed out above (see Section III), there is no evidence for the existence of clandestine regional centers which act as transmission points for

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CPSU in the field, and the various claims that individuals act as representatives of the CPSU to foreign Parties remain unsubstantiated. A reasonably large number of so-called "Comintern reps" were identified for the prewar years, but the large numbers of purported "Comintern agents," "Politburo representatives" and "men from Moscow" constantly reported from all over the globe during the postwar period have normally been engaged in much less significant aspects of Communist activity.

Similarly, there is nothing to support the assumption that CPSU avails itself of the field communication machinery of the MGB for purely Party matters. In spite of the fact that the remnants of OMS were absorbed by State Security and that it would be extremely advantageous to exploit the high security of MGB operations in order to facilitate Party communications, the principle of divorcing Soviet intelligence operations from the political business of Communist Parties apparently still prevails.

30. The exploitation of foreign Communist Parties by Soviet intelligence agencies must not be confused with the problem of controlling foreign Party organizations politically. The recruitment of local Party members or crypto-Communists for Soviet intelligence operations is a long-established practice. Initiated by the Comintern and perfected by the MGB and GRU, it is part and parcel of the conspiratorial nature of the international movement, as can be amply documented by past and recent case histories. Obviously, in the course of such joint operations the legal or illegal Soviet resident "controls" local Communists either directly or through other Party functionaries. Such control measures, however, have traditionally been confined to the complex intelligence operations in question, and judging from available evidence, have never been utilized for political control purposes.
- In general the exploitation of Communist Parties and their auxiliary organizations by Soviet intelligence agencies is greatly facilitated by the fact that every Party, according to need and feasibility, normally engages in undercover (illegal) activities in addition to its overt political work: penetration of government, armed forces, police, merchant marine, hostile political organizations; sabotage; preparation of military-revolutionary action, including necessary intelligence and counter-intelligence operations--in short, a Party performs for its own use on the national level "illegal" functions which stem directly from the basic concept of the Party as an instrument of revolutionary struggle. Such functions may be performed by a special undercover organization within the Party (illegal apparatus) or simply, in a less formalized manner, by the normal executive organs and functionaries of the Party itself. In the prewar past the Comintern assisted in the development of "illegal apparatus" by furnishing specialized training facilities, funds, and "instructors" for dispatch to the field. Currently it is not known to what extent CPSU or Soviet intelligence agencies--over and beyond the "normal" exploitation by recruitment of individual agents--assist and control Parties in the general implementation of "illegal" functions. It must, however, be anticipated that with the sharpening of the East-West conflict the CPSU will be increasingly concerned with the development of the clandestine action potential of foreign Parties.

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The postwar "communication system" of CPSU, as reflected in available evidence, appears to be based on individual informal contacts and presents no well-defined organizational pattern. On the headquarters level, direct contacts of foreign Party leaders with CPSU personnel inside the Soviet Union are frequently arranged, but the physical and social circumstances of these meetings make it virtually impossible to ascertain what problems are discussed. Furthermore, official Soviet representatives in the field play some part in this matter of directing national Parties, but their role is fairly definitely much more restricted than is generally assumed. Finally, although the CPSU has an innumerable variety of potential "contact points" with foreign Parties in the field which may be utilized at will, little evidence exists to indicate that any of these channels are actually employed. For the moment this irregular and informal "system" of control may be accepted as the closest approximation to the actual state of affairs in this rather elusive field of CPSU organizational control of foreign Parties outside the Soviet belt.

1. Contacts Inside the USSR and the Satellite Belt. One of the simplest and most secure means of directing the operations of foreign Parties is to call their leaders to headquarters for discussion. The normal practice of summoning satellite Party leaders to the USSR extends also to ranking Party functionaries outside of Soviet-dominated territory. A few representative cases may be cited.

Partsalidis, representing CP Greece (KKE), went with a delegation of the National Liberation Front (EAM) to Moscow in January 1946 and, without the knowledge of the rest of the delegation, carried on confidential discussions with A.A. Zhdanov; S.A. Lozovski, former secretary of the Profintern; O.V. Kuusinen, former member of the Political Secretariat of the Comintern; Molotov; and former leaders of the Communist International Youth.

Mao Tse-tung and Li Li-san, Politburo/CP China, visited Moscow in September-October 1947 to discuss the position of CP China. These two leaders supposedly head opposing Party "factions", Mao Tse-tung being characterized as the leader of the nationalist and Li Li-san as the head of the pro-Soviet wing. Li Li-san visited Moscow again in February and March 1948.

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On the occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the Revolution in November 1947 several European leaders went to Moscow: among them were Maurice Thorez, Jeanette Vermeersch and Laurent Casanova, all of CP France; Dolores Ibarruri, secretary general of CP Spain; and Nikolas Zachariades, leader of CP Greece. Although these functionaries had a valid public "excuse" for their trip, it is unlikely that matters of common interest were not discussed with members of the Politburo/CPSU. Maurice Thorez again went to the USSR for an interview with Stalin at Sochi in January 1948.

Vicente Uribe Galdeano and Fernando Claudin, Politburo/CP Spain, were in Moscow in January 1948, reportedly as guests of Malenkov, and not members of the Spanish colony there.

Zachariades, the leader of CP Greece, was in Moscow in January 1948 reportedly to seek recognition for the "Free Greek Government." It was at this same time that Dimitrov was rebuked by Pravda for his statement on the Balkan Federation, and discussions were held between Greek, Yugoslav and Bulgarian Communists on the subject of Macedonia.

Palmino Togliatti, secretary general of CP Italy left on 1 March 1948 for Moscow, seven weeks before the Italian elections.

Vilho Pessi, secretary general of CP Finland, and Aimo Maltonen, travelled to Moscow in August 1948 reportedly to make arrangements for the 30th anniversary of CP Finland.

In addition to ranking Party functionaries, less important foreign Communists constantly travel into the USSR and the satellite belt for various reasons--VOKS and "study" tours, meetings of international front organizations, visits of trade delegations, celebrations, anniversaries, etc. It is clear that if CPSU deems it necessary, it may avail itself of such individuals as intermediaries and couriers.

The movement of ranking Communists into the USSR and the satellite belt in the postwar period has usually proceeded overtly and without

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recourse to false passports or clandestine border crossings although certain more circuitous travel methods have been used. Two leading Scandinavian Communists, for example, arrived in Finland within ten days of each other in November 1947 in order "to study the work of CP Finland"—a strong presumption exists that they went on to Moscow.

The technical difficulties of checking on unofficial travel movements within the satellite orbit make it impossible to state whether deceptive methods may have become general practice. It is known, however, that Communist travel in the satellite areas in Europe—and thence to the USSR—has been facilitated by the issuance of passports to ranking functionaries which are valid for the entire satellite area without requiring a special visa for each country. Austrian Communists, for example, who desire to travel to satellite countries apparently do not need to apply to the Austrian authorities but may obtain special certificates from Soviet authorities in Vienna, entitling them to cross the Soviet road-blocks between Austria and Hungary and between Austria and Czechoslovakia. Special procedures are employed to circumvent Austrian border control.

So much then for direct contacts between the CPSU center and the subordinate leadership. The exact conditions under which such contacts are called for by the CPSU leadership and the degree to which they are found adequate for strategic control, especially during critical periods of Party action, are of course impossible even to estimate. Their significance, however, cannot be overestimated. The conditions under

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31. Travel to the USSR may be securely and totally concealed by the manipulation of passports, and it is likely that Communists involved in clandestine Party work, rather than ranking leaders, employ this cover method of travel. In the postwar period one such case has been reliably reported. Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, a Communist from Colombia, went to France in 1946 to study pedagogy on a fellowship granted him by the French Government. Through a Spanish Communist in Paris Jaramillo Uribe was recommended for training at the "Institute for Red Professors" in Moscow. In order to avoid arousing police interest, the Soviet Embassy in Paris did not visa his passport but gave him a special document which was equivalent to the visa used in other countries. This practice was frequent in the 1930's when Communists traveled illegally to the USSR and received from Soviet legations and embassies visas on separate detached sheets which could be used at the USSR border without being reflected in the subject's passport.

32. The CPSU has exercised long-distance control over Party leaders slow to accept the postwar line by pressure methods, as in the case of Earl Browder, Tito, and possibly Joshi of CP India.

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which they take place adequately guarantee the complete security of the subjects discussed and the decisions reached. When we turn, however, to an assessment of the control relationships maintained outside this protected area and inside the bastions of capitalism, we are confronted with a highly variable and complex situation.

2. Contact with Official Representatives of the USSR in the Field.

The extent to which the Soviet Party-Government employs official and semi-official representatives of the USSR in "bourgeois" countries to control foreign Parties--transmit funds and instructions, act as general supervisors or advisers--is determined by the exigencies of the individual national situation and the importance of the role of the local Party in current world-wide Communist strategy. The CPSU considers Party members within the government agencies of the USSR as leading Communist activists, but the following analysis of the available evidence reveals that the CPSU today does not generally exploit such personnel in the field for controlling the local Party on a permanent assignment basis.

From the days when the first official and semi-official representatives of the new Soviet Government first took up their residence abroad, the suspicion has been generally entertained that these official installations have as one of their primary functions the control of the local Parties. In the early and more amateurish days of the Soviet regime and of the Comintern, official Soviet representatives abroad assisted and guided Communist Parties on a large scale--in fact, the first substantial financial contribution to the movement abroad was made directly by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. With the refinement of the conspiratorial methods of the Comintern, however, the direct utilization of diplomatic personnel for Party purposes appears to have been gradually restricted, except in the field of secret intelligence.

A constant source of confusion in evaluating the activities of Soviet officials abroad has been the fact that Soviet diplomatic representatives continuously engage in liaison work with certain pro-Soviet groups and organizations abroad, generally on a more or less

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overt basis. This type of activity, although "subversive" from the point of view of the local authorities, does not necessarily represent Party control work any more than it inevitably implies secret intelligence activities. The contacts of Soviet officials with the various national "USSR Friendship Societies" and "Societies for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union" are to be accepted as "normal" missions of the individual officials involved—the abundant documentation of such, often confidential contacts and of the financial support given to such organizations has as yet failed to include any reliable evidence that control of the local Party is exercised through these channels.

Similarly open to misinterpretation are the efforts of the Soviet Government, channeled through its officials abroad, to propagandize, organize, and control Slav elements in foreign countries, notably in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, China, France and the Middle East. From the creation of the first All-Slav Committee in Moscow in 1941 to the final organization of the All-Slav Committee in Belgrade in 1946, Soviet officials have consistently initiated, assisted and guided such pressure groups abroad as the Union Eslava and its affiliates in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay; the various Soviet Citizens' Clubs in China; the Union of Soviet Citizens in France, Belgium, and French

33. VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries), organized in Moscow in 1923, has served both the Comintern and the Soviet Government for the past twenty-five years as an organizational focal point for pro-Soviet propaganda and pressure groups abroad. Two types of national organization have been developed under VOKS tutelage: the various "Societies for Cultural Relations with the USSR" which cater to intellectuals, and organizations of the "Friends of Soviet Russia" variety which look for support among sympathetic members of the non-Communist proletariat. In the prewar period, VOKS was under control of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. An official of the respective legation or embassy, acting on behalf of VOKS, handled organization, moral and financial support of, as well as liaison with, the national organizations of this type and arranged propaganda tours to the USSR. During the war and currently the old pattern has prevailed—Soviet cultural or press attaches generally maintain contact with the Communist or pro-Soviet leaders of the various national Soviet cultural institutes and friendship societies, assisting these organizations and their newspapers financially, appearing often with their superiors at their public meetings, and using them for distribution channels of "Soviet Information Bulletins," films, and other propaganda materials.

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Morocco, and many others. ~~SECRET~~ These efforts by official representatives of the satellite governments, who appear to be in charge of similar activities among their erstwhile nationals abroad, the Soviet Government has exploited these connections for repatriation, propaganda, and intelligence purposes. Here again, the control of these groups must be differentiated from that of the local Party, and evidence for the one provides no support for assuming the existence of the other. It is perhaps worth pointing out that neither the "friendship" societies nor the Slav groups provide particularly desirable intermediaries between the local Soviet representatives and the local Party, either from the point of view of security or of efficiency.

It has frequently been claimed that within each Soviet legation or embassy the head of the Party (CPSU) cell in that installation is also in charge of all contacts with the local national Party. No worthwhile evidence supports this assumption. The head of the CPSU cell in a Soviet organization abroad, although in Party terms often outranking his official superiors, is chiefly concerned with the political control of the Soviet personnel at the post, including such matters as Party discipline, indoctrination and security, and very likely may be completely untrained and inept at handling foreign political matters.

The contact radius of official and semi-official Soviet representatives abroad provides innumerable potential channels for Party control purposes. On the basis of actual evidence, however, only in the Middle East do official Soviet representatives consistently and continuously direct and assist the local Communist movement. The case of the Soviet Legation in Beirut (Lebanon) is well-documented and merits a summary presentation.

During the past two years the Soviet Minister to the Levant, Daniil Solod (recalled 29 July 1948 for service with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow), and other personnel of the legation staff, such as the first secretary, Viktor Khangulov, and the press attache and TASS representative, Aleksandr Sergeyev, have performed functions vis-a-vis the Lebanese and Syrian Parties equivalent to what would

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have been classified in Comintern jargon as "close co-operation" with a Communist Party. They have subsidized the Parties mentioned; they have maintained constant personal contact with the Party leadership; they have afforded guidance and direction; and they have used the existing Party channels to extend their radius of control over other Parties and Party elements in the Middle East, notably Iraq, Transjordan and Egypt. The organizational responsibility of the Beirut Legation may best be illustrated in terms of its subsidization and direction activities. All external Party funds of the Levant Parties appear to have been channelled exclusively through the Soviet Legation to the leading Communist functionaries. Transfers included funds for election expenses in 1947; for the maintenance of Communist magazines (1947); for the purchase of arms (1948). Special subsidies for the Armenian section of the Lebanese Parties were channelled through successful Armenian businessmen. The Party funds transferred were apparently forwarded from Moscow as budget requirements of the legation. In December 1947, leading members of the Syrian and Lebanese Parties were told that Minister Solod had requested an increase in funds allotted to the Parties, and in January 1948 the budget of the legation was reported as nearly double that of 1947. Although the Levant leaders were advised not to be seen at the legation except for official parties, confidential meetings between Shawi, secretary general of CP Lebanon, Khalid Bagdash, president of CP Syria, and Solod and Khangulov took place regularly during 1946, 1947 and during 1948 even after the Levant Parties had been outlawed. Khangulov was assigned the immediate responsibility for direction of the Levant Parties, and performed this function from 1947 until the suppression of the Syrian and Lebanese Parties in the winter of 1947-48. The formal relationship between the legation and the Levant Parties is further attested to by the assignment of permanent liaison personnel on the part of CP Lebanon (Raif Kuri) and its Armenian section (Artin Madoyan). The controls exercised by the legation included organizational matters (collaboration of CP Lebanon with CP Syria and Palestine in

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the matter of preparing monthly progress reports on Communism in Palestine), formulation of the political line of the Levant Parties vis-a-vis the Palestine question, preparation of progress reports by CP Lebanon for the use of the legation, and discussion of methods of continuing Party work underground. Direction of the Communist movement in Egypt reportedly involved the transmission of instructions and funds via the Arab League for National Liberation in Palestine. The Iraq Communist Party apparently receives instructions from Beirut either directly through legation officials or indirectly through members of CP Syria.

Confidential contacts between ranking local Party leaders and official Soviet personnel in other parts of the world have only occasionally come to notice. In Western Europe, the Soviet Embassy in Rome has maintained contacts with Italian Communist leaders (Togliatti, Longo), and has reportedly transmitted instructions and funds to them on behalf of CPSU. Lalmand, secretary general of CP Belgium, and Dispy, member of the Politburo of CP Belgium, have been observed frequently entering the Soviet Embassy in Brussels. In Latin America Fabio Grobart, the secretary for organization of the Partido Socialista Popular in Cuba, frequently visited the Soviet Legation in Havana between six and seven A.M., during the fall of 1946. In the winter of 1946-47 his wife was observed visiting the legation, and upon leaving, carried envelopes to Blas Roca, secretary-general of the Party. During the summer of 1947, the wife of the deputy secretary-general of CP Uruguay visited the legation in Montevideo several times. Such personal meetings between the effective local Communist leaders or their trusted contacts and a Soviet representative obviously provide an efficient, if not completely secure, means for transmitting instructions or "advice" in countries with which diplomatic relations are maintained by the USSR.

Beyond the small amount of evidence adduced above, however, no grounds exist for assuming that this method of contact has been adopted as general practice. The automatic acceptance of significant participation by local Soviet officials in the control and direction of the national Party itself is, within our present knowledge,

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completely unjustified and provides an oversimplified version of the complex and variable organizational relationships that actually do exist. The absence of substantial positive evidence obviously does not justify a generalized negative stand on this point--the investigative difficulties of detecting such participation carried out by professional clandestine methods are only too apparent. It would appear advisable, however, to take each Party-legation/embassy complex as a problem by itself and not permit an assessment of the local situation to be confused either by an unwarranted assumption of direct liaison or by misconstruction of overt and relatively routine propaganda or repatriation contacts.

3. Contacts with Fraternal Delegates of CPSU. The dispatch by the CPSU of fraternal delegates to national Party congresses appears to have been recently renewed. The first known instance in the postwar period involved the presence of Pavel Yudin, Vagan Grigoryan and Dmitri Shevliagin at the Sixth National Congress of CP Italy (Milan, January 1948). The reports received on the activities of these men were conflicting, but it appears highly likely that private conferences were held with the attending foreign leaders. It should be noted that Shevliagin has been previously reported as a member of CC/CPSU "in charge of Italian affairs."

Somewhat more specific are the reports concerning the Second National Congress of CP India (28 February-7 March 1948, Calcutta), which was preceded by the South East Asia Youth Conference (19-28 February 1948, Calcutta). The latter meeting was attended by several Soviet delegates who devoted most of their time to private conferences with the Communist leaders from India, Burma, Ceylon and Australia. The sudden shift in the political line of CP India and Burma from united front tactics to radical action which occurred at the Second National Congress may very possibly be connected with the presence of the Soviet delegates.

4. Other Contacts in the Field. The Soviet Party-Government, like any "bourgeois" government, extends various minor governmental agencies into foreign countries for a variety of commercial, cultural,

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military and other reasons. Many of these agencies abroad maintain more or less overt contacts with foreign Communists and sympathizers, and employ local Communists in their offices. They are generally viewed with suspicion by local security authorities and have been reported from every corner of the globe as clandestinely engaged in the control of a local Party. On the basis of available evidence no such generalizations are tenable. With very few exceptions (e.g., the expedition of Soviet scientists to observe the solar eclipse in Brazil (1947) which arranged for the return of the well-known Communist Harry Berger @ Evert to his native Germany on a Soviet vessel), the minor Soviet agencies abroad have not generally been involved in the provision of actual direction or assistance to foreign Parties.

Similarly undocumented is the extent to which the CPSU avails itself of the diplomatic and semi-official agencies of the satellite Party-Governments, particularly in countries where there is no Soviet representation. In view of the fact that the Foreign Ministries of the "new democracies" have been staffed with many, from the Soviet point of view, "unreliable" elements and in view of the Soviet program for the ideological solidification of the satellite Parties themselves which have absorbed a great number of opportunists, adventurers and half-Communists during their wartime growth, it is improbable that the CPSU has readily entrusted conspiratorial business to satellite personnel abroad whose defection rate, moreover, has been conspicuously high. Prior to the Tito affair reports pictured almost every Yugoslav official serving abroad as a "channel" for Moscow; current reports assign Polish and Rumanian personnel the general function formerly ascribed to the Yugoslavs--both ascriptions appear to be equally unfounded.

34. TASS, the Soviet news agency; MEZH DUNARODNAYA KNIGA (International Book) and its foreign outlets for Soviet literature; SOYUZINTORGKINO and its film distributors (ARTKINO, SOVKINO, et al.); INTURIST, the Soviet travel agency; the purchasing and economic missions as well as the export and import agencies and banking installations under control of the Ministry of Foreign Trade; military, aeronautic, naval and repatriation missions; expeditions under control of the Academy of Sciences; foreign outposts of the All-Union Red Cross and Crescent Society; delegations of the Orthodox Church; the Soviet Merchant Marine; the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), and many others.

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Since the inception of World War II, the CPSU has become increasingly active in the organization of, and direct participation in, international front organizations which, in a fashion, have replaced the "solar plexus" of auxiliaries formerly under Comintern control.³⁵ There can be no doubt that these organizations furnish convenient opportunities for contact between the Soviet representation and foreign Communists at executive sessions inside and outside of the USSR and the satellite areas, during trips of delegations joined by Soviet representatives, at festivals, congresses, exhibitions and on numerous other occasions. The Soviet Party-Government is vitally interested in the control of these international pressure groups, but evidence for the effective, although not always unchallenged, control of these organizations by CPSU, obviously exercised through co-ordination with the affiliated foreign Communist elements, cannot be automatically taken as proof for the exercise of general Party control in matters other than the Party fraction's participation in the relevant organization. In spite of

35. The principal international front organizations in which CPSU or CPSU-controlled fractions share executive control are:

<u>Soviet Fractions</u>	<u>International Organization</u>
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions	World Federation of Trade Unions
All-Union League of Soviet Youth (Komsomol) and Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth	World Federation of Democratic Youth and International Union of Students
Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Women	International Federation of Democratic Women
Individual Delegates	International Federation of European Partisans
Individual Delegates	International Association of Democratic Lawyers
Individual Delegates	International Organization of Journalists
Individual Delegates	International Federation of Former Political Prisoners
All-Slav Committee of the USSR	All-Slav Committee
Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee	Reportedly directing CP Palestine (PKP) directly and through channels of CP France
Individual Delegates	World Congress of Intellectuals

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the number and variety of potential control channels available to CPSU in this field, the paucity of available factual evidence leads to the assumption that they play virtually no role in the informal contact system of overall Party control. This "system," however, is of such an elusively oral character³⁶ as to prevent any other than tentative conclusions at the moment.

36. There has always been much talk, in police, governmental and lay circles, of "directives from Moscow." In many cases these are naively envisaged as written statements of instructions, often in Russian, generally purporting to bear the imprint of the Politburo/CPSU or the signature of one of its members. It is a fact, however, that the occasional "written directives" which have been procured from "highly reliable" sources during the past several years, whether purporting to originate with the Cominform (Protocol M in Germany) or directly from the CPSU (purported minutes of a secret session at the original Cominform meeting in Poland, September 1947, enclosing Zhdanov's instructions to the directorate of CP Italy), have not stood up under critical inspection. Since the forging of these so-called "directives" was a fairly common practice before the war when they were actually employed under the aegis of the Comintern, it may be expected that similar fabrications will continue to crop up, more particularly in areas where Communist capabilities produce serious apprehensions as to their "illegal" intentions.

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SECRETConcluding Note

This interim survey, based on the acceptable evidence available, has provided no definitive answers to the complex organizational questions concerned with the operations of international Communism. It has attempted to bring some perspective into a field which has been, and is, confused by countless preconceptions, uncritical generalizations and sensational nonsense. The postwar period has produced a generous amount of uninformed or fabricated reportage on this subject, mainly from highly unobjective anti-Soviet sources and professional intelligence merchants, which has secured as ready a market as prewar "inside" information on the Comintern. Some perspective of probable fact is almost essential to serve as a yardstick for the proper evaluation of this reportage.

The importance of organizational controls within the Communist movement must itself be viewed within the broader perspective of Soviet-Communist capabilities in the postwar period. The Party-Governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania are now under direct CPSU control, and it is an open question whether or not CP Yugoslavia can maintain its "independence" for any extended period of time. CP Greece in fact belongs organizationally to the satellite group, and CP Germany will be directly controlled by the CPSU for the foreseeable future. Of the key mass Parties outside this immediate Soviet-satellite orbit, CP China may communicate with CPSU at will, and CP France, with its colonial Party adjuncts, and CP Italy are Cominform affiliates. The strongest and most effective segment of the international Communist movement is now under the permanent, direct organizational control of the CPSU.

The peace-time future of the international Communist movement during the next decade will be largely determined by the political-revolutionary capabilities of these Parties, and not by the capabilities of a global organizational control system embracing all the Parties of the world. The other relatively minor components of the world movement will, in sum, contribute substantially to the more effective

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implementation of Soviet foreign policy only by tactical support operations aimed at the general weakening of the political, economic, and military potential of the non-Soviet world. In the event of war, however, the possible contribution of these non-mass Parties and Party fragments to the Soviet war effort will be enormously widened since the work of numerically weak organizations or even of relatively isolated individuals can reach levels of effectiveness in espionage and sabotage operations not attainable in political, propagandistic, and para-military activities. It may be anticipated that the CPSU, on the organizational level, will concentrate primarily on developing the clandestine or "illegal" action potential of the Parties in the non-Soviet world, both through the provision of adequate training funds and the support of clandestine communications channels among relevant groups of Parties and with the CPSU itself. This task, as prewar experience adequately proves, is not an easy one, but in terms of strengthening the Communist action potential it can reasonably be accepted as strategically more significant than the broadening of the regional Cominform organization or its replacement by a formal Comintern-type system of overt and covert global control.

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APPENDIX A

CURRENT NATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS OF ECCI MEMBERS ELECTED IN 1935

The following list supplies the current national assignments of the known and surviving members of Executive Committee of the Communist International elected in 1935. The letter P after a name indicates membership in the Presidium of the Comintern; the letter S in the Political Secretariat. Dead, retired, or unidentified ECCI members are listed at the end of the list.

Argentina

GHIOLDI, Rodolfo CC/CP Argentina

Australia

SHARKEY, L.L. Chairman/CP Australia

Austria

KOPLINIG, Johann (P) Chairman/CP Austria

Brazil

PRESTES, Luis Carlos Secretary General/CP Brazil

Bulgaria

DIMITROV, Georgi (P,S) Politburo/CP Bulgaria

KOLAROV, Vasil (P) Politburo/CP Bulgaria

STEFANOV, Boris @ Col. STEPANOV USSR?

Canada

BUCK, Tin National Executive/Labor Progressive Party, Canada

China

CHEN Shao-yu @ Wang Ming (P,S) CC/CP China

CHOU En-lai Politburo/CP China

K'ANG (?KAY) Sheng (P) Central Political Security Board/CP China

MAO Tse-tung Chairman/CP China

Cuba

CALDERIO, F.W. @ ROCA, Blas Secretary General/ Partido Socialista Popular, Cuba

Czechoslovakia

GOTTWALD, Klement (P,S) Chairman/CP Czechoslovakia

SIROKI, Vilian Chairman/CP Slovakia

ZAPOTOCKI, Antonin President, Trade Union Council (URO)

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SECRETFrance

GACHIN, Marcel (P)	Politburo/CP France
DUCLOS, Jacques	Politburo/CP France
FRACHON, Benoit	Secretary General/Confederation General du Travail, France
GUYOT, Raymond	Politburo/CP France
MARTY, Andre (P,S)	Politburo/CP France
THOREZ, Maurice (P)	Secretary General/CP France

Germany

DAHLEM, Franz	Central Secretariat/SED, Berlin
PIECK, Wilhelm (P,S)	Chairman/SED Berlin
ULBRICHT, Walter	Central Secretariat/SED, Berlin

Great Britain

BRADLEY, Benjamin	Colonial Department/CP Gt. Britain
CAMPBELL, John Ross	Politburo/CP Great Britain
DUTT, R. Palme	Politburo, Vice-Chairman/CP Great Britain
GALLACHER, William (P)	Executive Committee/CP Great Britain
POLLITT, Harry (P)	Secretary General/CP Great Britain

Greece

ZACHARIADES, Nicholas	Secretary General/CP Greece
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Hungary

RAKOSI, Matyas	Secretary General/ CP Hungary
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Italy

GRIECO, Ruggero @ GARLANDI (P)	Directorate/CP Italy
TOGLIATTI, Palmiro (P,S)	Secretary General/CP Italy

Japan

NOZAKA, Sanzo @ Sano Soki	Politburo/CP Japan
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Netherlands

SCHALKEN, Jan	Secretary General/CP Holland
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Norway

LOEVLIEN, Emil	Politburo/CP Norway
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Rumania

? LUCA, Vasile	Politburo/CP Rumania, 1947
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Spain

IBARNURI, Dolores

Secretary General/CP Spain

Sweden

LENDEROTH, Sven Lasse (P)

Chairman, CP Sweden

USA

FORD, James W.

National headquarters/CPUSA

FOSTER, William Z.

Chairman, National Board/CPUSA

GREEN, Gilbert

National headquarters/CPUSA

DEAD

DIAZ, Jose/Spain

FLORIN, Walholm/Germany

GORKIC, M.M./Yugoslavia

HECKERT, Fritz/Germany

ITSIKAWA/Japan

JACQUEMOTTE, Joseph/Belgium

? KORITSCHONER, Fritz/Austria

KUN, Bela/Hungary

LESZYNSKI, Julius @ LENSKI/Poland

PO Ku/China

SVIERMA/Czechoslovakia

THAELMAN, Ernst/Germany

VISSEER, Louis/Holland

PURGED

BROWDER, Earl/USA

PRUCHNIAK/Poland

DEFECTORS

CHANG Kuo-tao/China

KOEHLER, Bruno/Czechoslovakia

NO TRACES

BELEWSKI/Poland

HABUD Salim

BRONKOWSKI/Poland

HAYEN @ KHAYEN

DEENBERGER

QUIEROS, Antonio/Portugal

DIMITRIU/Rumania

SHABLIN/Bulgaria

FURINI/Italy

STOINOV/Bulgaria

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APPENDIX B

LEADING FOREIGN COMMUNISTS IN THE USSR DURING
WORLD WAR II
(Tentative List)

The following list contains names of non-Russian Communists living in the USSR during World War II. Names of Comintern functionaries are marked with an asterisk.

The following abbreviations have been used:

CC	Central Committee
CGT	Confederation Generale du Travail (General Labor Federation)
CPG	Communist Party of Germany
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
FDJ	Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth)
KDED	Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands (Cultural League for the Democratic Rejuvenation of Germany)
NCFG	National Committee Free Germany
PPR	Polish Workers' Party
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
WFJY	World Federation of Democratic Youth

AUSTRIAN COMMUNISTS

Name	Activity	Present Status
BRICHACHEK, Otto	In Moscow, 1944-45	CC/CP Austria, 1946 Chairman, Free Austrian Youth, 1947
DOBRETSHOFER, Anton	Co-signer of declaration of "Austrian Communists in Moscow," 1943	
FISCHER, Ernst	Editorial Board of "Communist International" after 1935 Main Austrian speaker on Radio Moscow, 1939-45	Politburo/CP Austria, 1947
FISCHER, Otto	Co-signer of declaration of "Austrian Communists in Moscow," 1943	CC/CP Austria, 1947
FRANK, Willy	Co-signer of declaration of "Austrian Communists in Moscow," 1943	
FUERBERG, Friedl	Teacher at Lenin School, Moscow Co-signer of declaration of "Austrian Communists in Moscow," 1943 Broadcasts to Austria, 1936-1944	Politburo, First Secretary/CP Austria, 1947

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Name	SECRET	Present Status
HEXMAN, Friedrich	Co-signer of declaration of "Austrian Communists in Moscow," 1943	CC/CP Austria, 1947
HONNER, Franz	Co-signer of declaration of "Austrian Communists in Moscow," 1943	Politburo, Deputy Chairman, CC/CP Austria, 1947
HUEBTER, Herbert	Co-signer of declaration of "Austrian Communists in Moscow," 1943	CC/CP Austria, 1947
*KOPLINIG, Johann	Co-signer of dissolution decree of Comintern, 1943 Co-signer of declaration of "Austrian Communists in Moscow," 1943	Chairman/CP Austria, 1947
ROSSAR, Robert	Co-signer of declaration of "Austrian Communists in Moscow," 1943	Secretary, Provincial Organization/CP Austria, Burgenland (Russian Zone), 1945
STERN, Leo	Co-signer of declaration of "Austrian Communists in Moscow," 1943 Reportedly held Colonelcy in Red Army	Reported head of Agitprop Department, CC/CP Austria 1946 Reported Provincial Headquarters, Bruck, 1947
ZUCKER-SCHILLING, Erwin	Broadcasts to Austria, 1939	CC/CP Austria

BULGARIAN COMMUNISTS

DAMYANOV, Georgi P.	Dimitrov's assistant in Comintern, 1936-43	Politburo/Workers Party (Communist)
*DIMITROV, Georgi M.	Sec. General of Comintern; after 1943 with unidentified Institute for Socialist Research	Politburo, Secretary General/Workers Party (Communist)
DOBREV, Krastyu Zhelyazkov	In USSR from ca. 1925 until 1944	CC/Workers Party (Communist)
*KOLAROV, Vasil		Politburo/Workers Party (Communist)
POPTOMOV, Vladimir	Worked closely with Dimitrov in USSR from ca. 1925 until 1944	Politburo/Workers Party (Communist)

CHINESE COMMUNISTS

LI Li-San	Expelled from CP China Lived in USSR from ca. 1932-1945 Attended Lenin School Worked for Profintern	Reinstated upon return in 1945 CC/CP China
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Name	Activity	Present Status
<u>CZECHOSLOVAKIAN COMMUNISTS</u>		
*GOTTWALD, Klement		Chairman/CP Czechoslovakia
KOPECKY, Vaclav	Information Dept/Comintern In USSR from 1938-45	Minister of Information
NEJEDLY, Zdenek	All-Slav Committee	Minister of Education
SIROKY, Viliam	In USSR 1935-44	Chairman/CP Slovakia
SLANSKY, Rudolf	Reportedly attached to Kiev Partisan Directorate, 1944	Sec. General/CP Czechoslovakia
SMIDKE, Karol	In USSR 1938-43	Vice President/ CP Slovakia
*ZAPOTOCKI, Antonin		President/Trade Union Council

FINNISH COMMUNISTS

AALTONEN, Aimo	Spent long periods in USSR	Chairman/CP Finland
AIKIA, Armas	Chief, Soviet-Finnish Radio during war 1939-40 Terijoki Government	CP Finland
LEHEN, Tuure Valdemar © LEHTI, Tuure	Exiled to USSR in 1918 Red Army M-School Lenin School Terijoki Government	Director, Kansan- kulttuuri
LEHTINEN, Inkeri	Lenin School Co-signer of Dissolution Decree of Comintern Terijoki Government	Editor, <u>Kommunisti</u>
LEINO, Yrjo (Husband of Hertta KUUSINEN)	Probably in USSR, 1941-44	Party Board/CP Finland
PARKKARI, Nestor		CP Finland
PESSI, Ville		Sec. General/CP Finland
*TUOMININ		?

FRENCH COMMUNISTS

*DUCLOS, Jacques	In USSR, 1940	Politburo/CP France
*FRACHON, Benoit	? In USSR, 1939	Sec. General/CGT
*MARTY, Andre	In USSR from 1940 to October 1943	Politburo/CP France

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Name	Activity	Present Status
<u>FRENCH COMMUNISTS (Continued)</u>		
RAEMETTE, Arthur Jean Baptiste	Reported in USSR after 1940	Politburo/CP France
*THOREZ, Maurice	In USSR from 1941 (?1943) to 1944 Broadcasts	Politburo/CP France
VERMEERSCH, Jeanette	In USSR with Thorez	CC/CP France
<u>GERMAN COMMUNISTS</u>		
ACKERMANN, Anton	CC/CPG	Central Secretariat/SED
ARENDSEE, Martha	NCFG	FDGB
BECHER, Johannes	CC/CPG NCFG	Central Secretariat/SED
BECHER, Lilli (Wife of BECHER, Johannes)	In USSR with husband	Berlin
BREDER, Willy	NCFG Propaganda Section/Red Army Editor <u>Das Wort</u>	Member of Land Government of Mecklenburg--Vorpommern, April 1947 KDED Presidium
ERMENDORFER, Karl	First Vice President NCFG	
ERPENBECK, Fritz	Propaganda Section Red Army NCFG	Central Secretariat/SED
FISCHER, Kurt	Radio Freies Deutschland, NCFG	Min. of Interior, Land Saxony
*FLORIN, Wilhelm		Dead
GUNDELACH, Gustav	In USSR 1940-45	Chairman/CP Hamburg
GUNDERMANN, Marianne	In Moscow after 1933	Personnel Dept., German Administration, Land Mecklenburg
HALLE, Felix		Dead?
HEILMANN, Fritz @ WINTER, Fritz	Radio Freies Deutschland, Radio Moscow	Licensee of <u>Thuringer Volk</u> , Thuringia
HERNSTEDT, Rudolf	NCFG	Managing Editor of <u>Berliner Zeitung</u>
HOFMANN, Karl		Radio Moscow <u>Pravda</u>
HOERNLE, Edwin	CC/CPG NCFG	Central Administration for Agriculture Executive Committee/ SED

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Name	Activity	Present Status
<u>GERMAN COMMUNISTS (Continued)</u>		
KEILSON, Grete	Secretary to Wilhelm Pieck	Secretariat/SED
KOENEN, Bernhard	CC/CPG	Chairman/SED, Saxony
KUREILA, Alfred	NCFG	Chief Editor of <u>Internationale Literatur</u> , USSR
MARON, Karl	NCFG	Deputy Mayor of Berlin, 1945 Head/SED, Berlin
MATERN, Herman	CC/CPG Founder of "Matern School" in Moscow, training center for German officers and exiles	Central Secre- tariat/SED, Berlin
NIEDERKIRCHNER, Michael	CC/CPG	SED, Berlin
*PIECK, Wilhelm	CC/CPG NCFG	Chairman/SED, Berlin
REMMELE, Carl (?Herman)	CC/CPG	Dead?
RUBINER, Frieda	Propaganda Section/Red Army	?
SCHNEIDER, Georg	NCFG	University, Jena
SCHWAB, Sepp	NCFG Radio Moscow	Central Secre- tariat/SED, Berlin
SOBOTKA, Gustav	CC/CPG	SED Chairman Exec. Committee/CPG, District Mecklen- burg-Vorpommern, 1946
ULBRICHT, Walter	CC/CPG NCFG	Central Secre- tariat/SED, Berlin
ULBRICHT, Rose (Wife of ULBRICHT, Walter)		
VALENTIN, Max		Director of Theatre School, Weimar
WEIMERT, Erich	CC/CPG NCFG Instructor in Antifa Schools Propaganda Section/Red Army	Head/KDED, Russian Zone, Germany
WILLMANN, Heinz	Radio Kuibyshev NCFG	Secretary General/ KDED Ideological Plan- ning/SED
WOLFF, Friedrich	NCFG	KDED Official owner of "Neues Leben," Publishing House of FDJ

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Name

Activity

Present Status

GERMAN COMMUNISTS (Concluded)WOLLWEBER, Ernst
FriedrichLeft Sweden for USSR in
November 1944 upon release
from jailCentral Adminis-
tration, Depart-
ment for Inland
Shipping and
Waterways

ZETTLER

Instructor at
Advanced Police
School/German
Administration
of Interior, BerlinZINNER, Hedda
(Wife of ERLENBECK
Fritz)NCFG
Radio Moscow

Radio Berlin

HUNGARIAN COMMUNISTS

BALAS, Bela

Hungary

BOLGAR, Elek

Lived in USSR for ca. 25
years
Reported Chief of Hungarian
Desk/NarkomindelChief Foreign
Relations Dept/
CP Hungary, 1947

FARKAS, Mihaly

Returned Hungary
ca. 1945
Deputy Sec.General/
Hungarian Workers
PartyFAZSKAS, Maria
(Wife of GERŐ, Ernő)Director, Partisan School
for Hungarian POWs, MoscowCouncillor in
Ministry of Trans-
portation

GERŐ, Ernő

In USSR for ca. 20 years

Secretariat/
Hungarian Workers
Party

KOSSA, Istvan

Surrendered to Red Army
Returned in 1944 as Com-
munist organizerSec.General/
Hungarian Trade
Union Council

LUKAS, Georg

Soviet-Hungarian
Cultural Society,
Hungary

MOLNAR, Gabor @ MAYER

Returned 1948,
allegedly as
special repre-
sentative of CPSU

MUNICH, Ferenc

In the USSR from 1941-44

Chief, Budapest
Police

NAGY, Imre

In USSR since early thirties

Politburo/Hungarian
Workers PartyPALFFY-OESTERREICHER,
Lt.Gen. GyorgyBroadcasts from Moscow in
1944
Returned with Rakosi in 1945Ministry of
Defense

*RAKOSI, Matias

Sec.General/
Hungarian Workers
Party~~SECRET~~

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Name	Activity	Present Status
<u>HUNGARIAN COMMUNISTS (Continued)</u>		
REVAI, Jozsef	Returned from USSR in 1945	Editor, CP central organ, <u>Szabad Nep</u>
VAS, Zoltan	Lived in USSR for ca. 20 years	Politburo/ Hungarian Workers Party

ITALIAN COMMUNISTS

D'ONOFRIO, Edoardo	Instructor in Antifa Schools Returned 1944	Secretary/Rome Federation Directorate/CP Italy
GERMANETTO, Giovanni	Instructor at Antifa Schools	Control Commission/ CP Italy
*GRIECO, Ruggero @ GARLANDI	Radio Moscow Returned 1945	Directorate/CP Italy
MISIANO, Lina	Radio Moscow Chief, Western European Section Member of CPSU	USSR Corresponds with Ugolini, former Unita corres- pondent in Moscow, now in Italy
MONTAGNANA, Rita (Wife of TOGLIATTI)	With Togliatti in USSR	Directorate/CP Italy
MOSCATELLI, Vincenzo (Gino)	Reported parachuted into Northern Italy from Russian plane (1941?)	CC/CP Italy (1946)
RAGAZZI @ CANESTRI	Radio Moscow, Italian Desk Reportedly replaced Robotti as representative of CP Italy	?
ROBOTTI, Paolo @ BIANCHI, Pietro (Brother-in-law of TOGLIATTI)	Instructor at Antifa Schools Reportedly replaced Togliatti and D'Onofrio after their return to Italy as repre- sentative of CP Italy Reported in contact with one Shevliagin (CC/CPSU), who was in charge of "studies on Italy."	?
ROSSI, Olga (Wife of PASTORE, Giorgio, editor of <u>Turia Unita</u>)	Radio Moscow, Translator	USSR?
SARTI	Radio Moscow, Editorial Desk	USSR?
*TOGLIATTI, Palmiro @ ERCOLI @ CORRENTI, Mario	Radio Moscow Antifa Schools	Sec. General/CP Italy

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Name	Activity	Present Status
<u>POLISH COMMUNISTS</u>		
BERMAN, Jakob	In USSR during war	Politburo/PPR
JEDRICHOWSKI, Stefan	Soviet citizen since 1940 Captain in Kosciuszko Division	CC/TPR
MINC, Hilary	Lectured at Soviet Univer- sity during war	Politburo/TPR
MODZELEWSKI, Cygmont	Organized First Kosciuszko Division in USSR during war	Politburo/TPR
RADKIEWICZ, Stanislaw	Joined Red Army 1941	CC/PPR
SKRZESZEWSKI, Stanislaw	Member of Union of Polish Patriots, Moscow 1943	CC/TPR
SPYCHALSKI, Marian	Resistance delegate to Moscow, 15 March 1944	Politburo/PPR
WITASZEWSKI, Kazimierz	Organizer of Union of Polish Patriots, Moscow, 1943	CC/PPR
ZAMBROWSKI, Roman	Chief of Political Instruc- tion Division of Polish Army formed in USSR during war	Politburo/PPR
ZAWADZKI, Alexander	Took part in defense of Stalingrad (1941) Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Polish Army in USSR, 1944	Politburo/PPR
<u>RUMANIAN COMMUNISTS</u>		
BODNARAS, Emil	In USSR from 1936-44	Chief Siguranza, Rumania
PAUKER, Ana	Probably attached to Partisan Directorate Reportedly attached to Rumanian Desk/Narkomindel Exchanged by agreement, 1941	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rumania
*STEFANOV, Boris (aka Col. STEFANOV)	In USSR since 1927 Red Army	USSR?
<u>SPANISH COMMUNISTS</u>		
CORDON Garcia, Antonio	Fled to USSR ca. 1939 Served in Yugoslavia during war Returned to France from USSR in 1946	CC/CP Spain, France, 1946
FERNANDEZ	Returned with wife from Ufa headquarters of Comin- tern to Moscow, 1943	?
GALLEGO Bezos, Ignacio	In USSR from 1941-45	Secretariat/CP Spain, France
*IBARRURI, Dolores	Fled to USSR ca. 1943	Secretary General/ CP Spain, France

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Name	Activity	Present Status
<u>SPANISH COMMUNISTS (Continued)</u>		
LISTER, Enrique (Gen.)	In USSR from ca. 1939-45	Politburo/CP Spain, France
MODESTO Guilloto, Juan (General)	In USSR from ca. 1939-45	Politburo/CP Spain, France
SANZ, Francisco Anton	In USSR from ca. 1939-45	Politburo/CP Spain, France

YUGOSLAV COMMUNISTS

MASLARIĆ, Bozidar (Lt.Gen.)	Vice President, All-Slav Committee, Moscow, 1941-44	CC/CP Yugoslavia, 1947
VLAHOV, Dinitar	In USSR from 1936-43 Delegate First All-Slav Congress, Moscow 1941	CC/CP Yugoslavia, 1947

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